



SINOPSIS

From Taipei to Brussels: Lessons from Taiwan for Europe's Response to Disinformation

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Executive Summary

In January 2024, the Republic of China (Taiwan) elected Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as its next president, ushering in a historic third term in power for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Thanks to an effective collaborative approach across government and civil society, to a great extent Taiwan has managed to counter interference from the People's Republic of China (PRC). As Taiwan's case shows, even the best-prepared societies face growing challenges from foreign interference and information manipulation. There is therefore an urgent need for democracies to learn from each other and coordinate efforts to withstand authoritarian threats.

The explosive rise of digital media and generative AI, declining trust in democratic institutions and disinformation-fuelled social polarisation are among the challenges. The European Union (EU) and its member states are not spared from these, presenting unconventional threats to national security, societal stability, and democracy. Challenges are interconnected: malign actors simultaneously deploy strategies and techniques related to influence and information operations across multiple domains and towards various target societies.

The EU and its member states have intensified institutional-level efforts to strengthen defenses against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They have further stepped up efforts in light of the growing China-Russia strategic alignment. Progress in the EU's response since the 2019 European Parliament elections includes new tools for platform regulation, the active engagement of different actors in society and dedicated legislation. However, the recent emphasis on FIMI may at points appear somewhat selective, focusing primarily on disinformation and information manipulation, while China historically relies more on propaganda, primarily promoting positive messages rather than spreading outright falsehoods. The Russian-style disinformation is a relatively new weapon in the CCP arsenal, although one that has been growing in importance since at least the 2020 Taiwan Presidential elections and the subsequent pandemic.

Within the cooperation framework the EU has already established with Taiwan, the bloc can learn from its social resilience consolidated throughout decades of



exposure to foreign interference attempts.¹ Taiwan is often cited as ‘patient zero’ of PRC information operations and provides valuable insight for Europe in improving its own, whole-of-society strategy. Learning from Taiwan’s experience can provide the knowledge and skillset to boost Europe’s resilience and defend democratic principles.

This brief provides the following key recommendations to the EU institutions:

- 1.Raise awareness of Taiwan’s experience with disinformation**
- 2.Strengthen the EU’s counter-disinformation capacity with Taiwan as inspiration**
- 3.Seek EU-Taiwan cooperation for local solutions**

¹ European External Action Service, [online](#).



Acronyms

AI – Artificial Intelligence

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

DPP - Democratic Progressive Party

DSA - Digital Services Act

EEAS - European External Action Service

EP - European Parliament

EU - European Union

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

FIMI - Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference

INGE - Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation

ISAC - Information Sharing and Analysis Centre

KMT – Kuomintang

OSINT - Open-Source Intelligence

PRC - People's Republic of China

PSG – Policy, Strategy and Global Priority Issues Team

TPP - Taiwan's People Party



Introduction

This policy brief aims to facilitate a strategic understanding of Taiwan's response to disinformation in a way that helps the EU to improve its own response. Through two case studies, the brief explores how information manipulation targeted the 2024 Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections (hereafter elections). Finally, the brief provides recommendations for the EU to strengthen its resilience through increased cooperation with Taiwan.

It is worth noting that Taiwan's experience might not cover all the challenges the EU and its member states face in terms of disinformation and misinformation. In fact, although both are aligned with democratic principles, the EU and Taiwan are confronted with a distinct set of challenges. Authoritarian state actors, their proxies, and non-state actors have sought to exploit these by tailoring their attacks according to local weaknesses, legal loopholes, and societal (often emotionally charged) vulnerabilities. Naturally, the responses to threats have been different in Taiwan and Europe, but guided by the common aim, namely to defend democratic governance.

Failing to adequately understand the factors shaping the effectiveness of Taiwan's response, may hinder the EU's efforts to learn from Taiwan and improve its own response. Although the EU has acknowledged the growing threat potential and has advanced in its efforts to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) in the context of countering hybrid threats, it still needs to coalesce a whole-of-society approach and operationalize FIMI on a member state level. The case of Taiwan can offer inspiration to further address this issue holistically.

2024 has been dubbed the year of elections, therefore pivotal for democracy. In January, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te as its next president. This is the first time that one party rules three consecutive terms after the democratization and introducing the first direct presidential voting in 1996. On the eve of the elections, president-elect Lai said: "Between democracy and autocracy, Taiwan stands on the side of democracy".² Beijing's response to the outcome of the elections was not surprising, stating that the elections "will not change the basic

² William Yang, 'Lai Ching-te Wins Taiwan Presidential Election', *Voice of America*, 13 January 2024, [online](#).



fact that Taiwan is part of China and there is only one China in the world”.[2] Taiwan has been living under an existential threat for decades, with pressure growing in particular following the 2016 presidential election of Tsai Ing-wen.

Under its one-China principle, Beijing maintains that there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the PRC government is the sole legal government. Beijing has tightened its sovereignty claims over the island, while insisting that Taiwan is the PRC’s internal affair. The EU never subscribed to Beijing’s one-China principle, but has its own one-China policy. Most importantly, the EU doesn’t take a position on Taiwan’s international status. Still, Beijing continues to falsely claim that EU-Taiwan cooperation violates Beijing’s one-China principle. With closer EU-China relations, over the years the bloc has neglected the need to push back against such false narrative and attempts to interfere in its cooperation with Taiwan.

In recent years EU-China relations have deteriorated and the EU has hardened its approach. Nonetheless, the EU continues to abide by its own one-China policy, in which it recognises the PRC as the sole legal government of China, though it refrains from making a determination on whether Taiwan is part of this “China”, and maintains cooperation with Taiwan without diplomatic recognition. Within these boundaries, EU-Taiwan ties have expanded, with both sides expressing interest in strengthening them further. This includes supporting each other in countering pressure from China aimed at undermining their bilateral cooperation.

Beijing has not only intensified its pressure on Taiwan but has sought to shape global narratives that favor PRC position on cross-Strait relations. This has also impacted its approach towards the EU. By excluding Taiwan from bilateral discussions, Beijing has sought and to some extent managed to shape Europe’s narrative on Taiwan. This has enabled Beijing to decrease Taiwan’s international space. As a frontline democracy, Taiwan remains a testing ground for Beijing’s hybrid threat tactics, which, once tested, may be used internationally.

The EU defines hybrid threats as state or non-state actors’ actions to exploit the vulnerabilities of the European institutions and its member states to their own advantage by using in a coordinated way a mixture of measures (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological) while remaining below the



threshold of formal warfare.³ Going forward, learning from Taiwan's experience in countering Beijing's information manipulation and influence operations may help strengthen the EU's democratic resilience.

The EU remains exposed to authoritarian threats, both from Russia and China. At the outset of the pandemic, in March 2020, Josep Borrell, EU High Representative at the time spoke of a "global battle of narratives", framing European concerns about Russia's and China's joint attempts to undermine democratic governance and promote an authoritarian alternative.⁴ With an increase in the volume and intensity of hybrid threats, the bloc has become more willing to push back against these and better equip itself to defend democracy.

Close cooperation with like-minded partners, including Taiwan, is central to the EU's approach to the Indo-Pacific, as reflected in its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy.⁵ Parliamentary diplomacy has played a crucial role in these efforts. In an unprecedented move, in November 2021, a cross-party delegation of the European Parliament's (EP) Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union including Disinformation (INGE) visited Taiwan. In their meeting with Taiwan's president, French legislator Raphaël Glucksmann summarized the nature of the visit: "We came here to learn from you".⁶

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on January 15, 2024', [online](#).

⁴ European External Action Service, 'EU HRVP Josep Borrell: The Coronavirus pandemic and the new world it is creating', 24 March 2020, [online](#).

⁵ European External Action Service, 'The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific', 16 September 2021, [online](#).

⁶ European Parliament, 'Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation, Mission Report', 6 December 2021, [online](#).



PRC Information Manipulation and Operations Efforts in Taiwan's 2024 Elections

Background

For many years, the PRC has conducted disinformation campaigns as part of its hybrid warfare (also referred to as gray-zone tactics) to influence Taiwanese society. The aim has been to reduce opposition towards unification with the PRC and to undermine Taiwan's democracy. These campaigns ramp up significantly during elections on the island.

In the previous two presidential elections in Taiwan, cross-Strait relations featured prominently among voters' priorities. The 2014 Sunflower movement sparked political change and later in 2016 President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected as the party gained more than half of the seats in parliament.⁷ The 2019 Hong Kong pro-democracy protests and subsequent crackdown, coupled with China's hard-line approach to Taiwan, played a significant role in the re-election of President Tsai and the DPP in the 2020 national election.⁸

PRC's current efforts to influence the Taiwanese populace in favour of unification may not be as effective as hoped. Only a small minority of Taiwanese voters are in favour of unification, namely 1.2 percent as reported by the National Chengchi University's Election Study Centre survey on core political attitudes in Taiwan conducted in 2023.⁹ 33.2 percent of respondents favour maintaining the status quo indefinitely, whereas 21.5 percent favour maintaining the status quo and moving towards independence. Identification with Taiwanese identity has increased significantly over the years. The survey

⁷ The Sunflower Movement was a student protest beginning in mid-March 2014. Hundreds of student protesters physically occupied Taiwan's national legislature for roughly three weeks to oppose a proposed free trade agreement with China; Ming-sho Ho, 'The Activist Legacy of Taiwan's Sunflower Movement', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2 August 2018, [online](#).

⁸ Interview with Christina Lai, 'The Impact of Hong Kong Protests on the Election in Taiwan', The National Bureau of Asian Research, 23 January 2020, [online](#).

⁹ Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 'Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2024/12)', 13 January 2025, [online](#).



shows that 61.7 percent of respondents identified as Taiwanese compared to only 2.4 percent of respondents who identified as Chinese.¹⁰

In contrast with previous presidential elections, the 2024 elections appeared to have shifted focus away from cross-Strait relations and the PRC to persistent domestic issues. Many young voters voiced their concerns with issues such as low and stagnant wages, rising living costs, and a lack of affordable housing.¹¹

Taiwan's Response to FIMI

Taiwan has sustained long-term PRC FIMI campaigns, but in 2018, the consequences of unrestrained dissemination of FIMI galvanized Taiwan's civil society and government to take action. That year, the tragic death by suicide of the Taiwanese diplomat in Japan, Su Chii-cherng, and later, Taiwan's local elections results were both suspected to be influenced by FIMI. Su Chii-cherng passed by suicide after significant backlash over accusations that he left Taiwanese tourists stranded during a typhoon in Japan while the Chinese embassy was able to rescue their citizens.¹² It was later revealed by the Taiwan Fact Check Center, the initial reports of rescue circulated by the PRC were false.¹³ The passing of Su Chii-cherng sparked alarm within the Taiwanese public and government. This alarm was further exacerbated by the results of the local elections and referendums on social issues in November 2018, the latter frustrating civil society activists. These results are believed to be influenced by PRC FIMI campaigns to some degree.

These incidents resulted in greater awareness within Taiwanese society and government. Since 2019, several CSOs have been formed that monitor and research PRC FIMI in tandem with government action in forms of several bills aimed at strengthening initiatives addressing FIMI. In 2024, Doublethink Lab published the report "Taiwan POWER: A Model for Foreign Information

¹⁰ Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 'Taiwanese / Chinese Identity(1992/06~2024/12)', 13 January 2025, [online](#).

¹¹ Eric Cheung, 'As election nears in Taiwan, many young voters say China isn't their biggest concern', *CNN*, 10 January 2023, [online](#).

¹² Stacy Hsu, 'Osaka envoy commits suicide', *The Taipei Times*, 15 September 2018, [online](#).

¹³ Taiwan Fact Check Center, '錯誤 媒體報導：日本關西機場因燕子颱風重創而關閉後，中國優先派巴士前往關西機場營救受困之中國旅客？', 9 September 2018, [online](#).



Manipulation & Interference Resilience”.¹⁴ In the report, author Ben Graham Jones provides an overview Taiwan’s response to PRC FIMI. He characterizes Taiwan’s response as a model of resilience which comprises of five components: (1) Purpose-driven, (2) Organic, (3) Whole-society, (4) Evolving, and (5) Remit-bound.

This report highlighted the distinctive whole-of-society approach Taiwan has deployed against PRC FIMI. Taiwan’s resilience is expressed across a swathe of institutions, including academia, CSOs and media, that share a clear sense of purpose – countering the threat of PRC FIMI. Other notable features of this response are that this model is decentralized with both formal and informal cooperation between different networks and institutions. This decentralization allows for organic and faster action and an approach that can quickly evolve in tandem with changes in the FIMI threat. Furthermore, Taiwan’s approach to PRC FIMI is ever-evolving in tandem with changes in the FIMI threat. Taiwanese CSOs also maximize collective efficiency by focusing on their own specializations, reducing duplication of existing work.

Despite international acclaim of Taiwan’s response to PRC FIMI, Taiwan continues to have significant vulnerabilities as identified in the report. These include a lack of regulation and transparency around subsidized trips for Taiwanese people to the PRC and financing of key institutions such as temples. Both these activities risk significant and impactful exposure to PRC FIMI. Other vulnerabilities include a lack of strategic vision for a whole-of-society response and a lack of capacity to counter PRC FIMI against Taiwan internationally.

Findings from the 2024 Taiwanese Election

Founded in 2019, Doublethink Lab (DTL) is a Taiwanese civil society organisation that researches the PRC’s malign interference and information operations. Since 2020, DTL has conducted observations on FIMI through a project called the Monitoring Hub (M-Hub).¹⁵ The M-Hub is a collaboration

¹⁴ Ben Graham Jones, ‘Taiwan POWER: A Model for Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Resilience’, Doublethink Lab, 9 August 2024, [online](#).

¹⁵ Doublethink Lab, ‘2024 Taiwan Elections: Foreign Influence Observations - Preliminary statement’, 28 February 2028, [online](#).



between Taiwanese fact-checking organizations, researchers, and civil society groups that aim to integrate civilian resources and analytical capabilities.

From October 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024, M-Hub conducted daily observations of Taiwan's major social media platforms, including PTT, DCard, Facebook, Instagram, Weibo, and Xiaohongshu. This open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigation focused on four characteristics of FIMI:

1. False information related to Taiwan's elections or current events.
2. Narratives aligning with the PRC's information warfare against Taiwan.
3. Data indicating involvement of suspected PRC or PRC-affiliated actors in dissemination.
4. Coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media.

M-Hub analyzed the data to determine whether the FIMI originated or was coordinated from abroad and if those involved had ties to PRC entities. During the months leading up to the election, DTL observed that suspected PRC-aligned actors amplified several negative narratives targeting the DPP to undermine the party, while exploiting domestic electoral issues to deepen polarisation.

The FIMI narratives collected from Taiwan's 2024 election focused on two key goals: distorting public perception and discrediting the DPP, and fostering hostility toward it.

These narratives were categorized into five main themes:

1. Weak governance
2. Defense and the Taiwan Strait conflict
3. Cross-Strait and diplomatic relations
4. Political party and politician controversies
5. Issues with democratic procedures

The dissemination of FIMI relied on tactics like amplifying conspiracy theories on social media and using fake personas and accounts to spread dis- and



misinformation. PRC state media, anonymous accounts, bot networks, and content farms played key roles in this.

DTL observed increasing polarization in Taiwanese society, noting the harmful use of generative AI and deepfake videos in these efforts. This not only threatens Taiwan's democracy but also poses a risk to other democracies, particularly in Europe.

The case studies, as explored below, involved: (1) a proposal to bring 100,000 Indian migrant workers to Taiwan, and (2) an e-book titled “The Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen”. These two case studies are based on research published in Doublethink Lab’s 2024 report.¹⁶

Case Study 1: From Online Narratives to Offline Mobilisation – The Case of Indian Migrant Workers in Taiwan

In late September 2023, news broke about a potential agreement between the Taiwanese and Indian governments to bring up to 100,000 Indian migrant workers to Taiwan to address the labour shortage.¹⁷ However, Taiwanese media and social media forums circulated the claim that 100,000 Indian migrants were moving to Taiwan in one go, fueling racist and fearmongering narratives, such as characterizing India as a country of sexual assault and warning that Taiwan would become unsafe.¹⁸ These narratives triggered public backlash and dissatisfaction with the DPP government. Suspected PRC-aligned actors exploited the controversy with the aim to foster distrust in the Taiwanese government and damage relations between India and Taiwan.

¹⁶ Doublethink Lab, ‘Artificial Multiverse: Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in Taiwan’s 2024 National Elections’, 13 August 2024, [online](#).

¹⁷ Rezaul H. Laskar, ‘Taiwan, India to seal pact on migration to overcome Taipei’s shortage of workers’, *The Hindustan Times*, 26 September 2023, [online](#).

¹⁸ ‘開放10萬印度移工，台灣要變性侵島！？’, *Dcard*, 15 November 2023, [online](#), [archived](#).



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CHINA IN CONTEXT AND PERSPECTIVE



Figure 1: Screenshot of Taiwanese social media platform DCard, which promoted the narrative that Taiwan would become a sexual assault island.

Headline translation: "If we let in 100,000 Indian labourers, will Taiwan become an island of sexual assault"?

DTL observed PRC media, particularly the Fujian Daily Paper, amplifying the controversy by reproducing social media posts from Taiwan. Headlines such as "Taiwan will import 100,000 Indian labourers, causing dissatisfaction on the island" reinforced anti-Indian sentiment and negative perceptions of India. Additionally, bot accounts related to China were found commenting on Radio Free Asia's posts, pushing narratives that opposed the influx of Indian workers and favored economic cooperation with China.



Figure 2: Screenshot of Weibo and Fujian Daily Paper

Headline translation: “Is Taiwan going to open up to 100,000 Indian migrant workers? Netizens on the island are worried that Taiwan will become a ‘sexual assault island’”



Figure 3: Radio Free Asia Tweet about the Taiwan-India memorandum of understanding.¹⁹

Tweet translation: “Is India-Taiwan deepening relations angering China? Taiwan and India are engaged in #labour transfer negotiations. If an agreement is reached, Taiwan can hire up to 100, 000 Indian labourers to alleviate #Taiwan’s labour shortage. Currently, China-India relations are tense and this agreement is likely to anger Beijing”

¹⁹ RFA Chinese, (@RFA_Chinese), X, 12 November, 2023, 7:47 AM, https://x.com/RFA_Chinese/status/1723487554731725274



Figure 4: (Left) a sample of inauthentic X accounts replying to the RFA tweet (image above) with similar narratives aimed at stoking polarisation. (Right) Machine translation to English.²⁰

These fake accounts often impersonated a Taiwanese social media user, however they used simplified Chinese, instead of the traditional Chinese used in Taiwan. Within a month, online discussions transitioned into offline action, including the "123 Don't Come, India" protest, though turnout was limited.²¹ It is important to emphasise the difficulty to attribute the online and offline actions surrounding the controversy to PRC FIMI actors. Nonetheless, this case illustrates how diplomatic and economic issues can be manipulated by PRC-aligned actors to deepen social polarization and reduce support for the DPP ahead of elections.

Case Study 2: The “Secret History” of Tsai Ing-wen E-Book and the Use of Generative AI

In December 2023, an e-book titled "Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen" surfaced online and quickly spread across social media, video platforms, and forums. This 100,000-word document, downloaded over 27,000 times, was part of an information operation aimed at discrediting the former Taiwanese president. The e-book mixed facts with political rumors, alleging moral corruption and claiming Tsai Ing-wen gained power through sexual promiscuity.

²⁰ RFA Chinese, (@RFA_Chinese), X, 12 November, 2023, 7:47 AM, [online](#).

²¹ Staff Writer, 'Indian migrant protest in Taipei', *Taipei Times*, 4 December 2023, [online](#).



The author, using the pseudonym Lin Leshu, remains unidentified. Nonetheless, signs suggest PRC involvement, such as errors related to converting simplified to traditional Chinese characters found throughout the e-book. Despite the absence of typical PRC propaganda outlets like state media, coordinated bot activity was observed across Facebook, X, YouTube, and TikTok, amplifying the e-book. Influencers and individuals received messages about it, and contents of the e-book spread across various platforms, including low-profile news sites.

This campaign appeared to aim to undermine the DPP by damaging Tsai's reputation ahead of the 2024 election.






Figure 5, 6: Inauthentic Facebook account post about the e-book (top)

Machine translation of post (below)²²

YouTube and TikTok were the main platforms for distributing over 20 versions of AI-generated videos related to the e-book. These videos, created using Capcut, a Chinese app from ByteDance, featured virtual AI anchors and voices reporting the e-book, including versions in other Chinese languages like Cantonese. Generative AI technology allowed for rapid content production across multiple languages with minimal effort. While still developing, the use of AI by malign actors demonstrates its potential to influence elections in liberal democracies by reducing the time and resources needed to produce and distribute disinformation.

²² River Morrow, Screenshot of Facebook Post, 10 January 2024, [online](#).



Figure 7: AI Generated Virtual Anchor reporting on 蔡英文秘史 in Cantonese

Translation: Tsai Ing-wen's Secret History²³

The State of Affairs in the EU

Evidence collected by EU institutions following the 2019 EP elections revealed sustained disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming to suppress turnout and influence voter preference.²⁴ The activities targeted various issues from challenging the EU's democratic legitimacy to exploiting divisive public debates on issues such as migration and sovereignty. Domestic political actors have often adopted tactics and narratives of Russian sources to attack the EU

²³ Cai-ying-wen-mi-shi.mp4, Google Drive, n.d., [online](#).

²⁴ Mark Scott and Lauren Cerulus, 'Russian groups targeted EU election with fake news, says European Commission', *Politico*, 24 June 2019, [online](#).



and its values. The findings highlight that both state and non-state disinformation campaigns pose a hybrid threat to the EU.²⁵

Since the 2019 elections, progress has been made towards a coordinated approach to tackle disinformation and better counter FIMI threats in the 2024 EP elections. At present, the EU recognizes FIMI as a growing security and foreign policy threat for the bloc. The EU has put in place a robust framework to facilitate the exchange of information between member states. Progress includes a shift of focus towards addressing FIMI from the PRC, in addition to Russia, the active engagement of a variety of societal actors, and finally, dedicated legislation. Yet further steps are necessary. What is needed in particular is a more effective and comprehensive bottom-up approach involving a strong civil society network countering disinformation on the ground.

Attention towards the origin of FIMI attacks has expanded beyond Russia to include the PRC as a hostile actor engaging in information manipulation. The 2nd European External Action Service Report on FIMI Threats highlights the PRC's "attempt to achieve their own political and economic goals by undermining the credibility of democratic institutions, and encouraging division and polarisation within European societies and beyond".²⁶

While some tactics overlap with those used by Russia, the PRC's growing influence marks a notable shift, necessitating new expertise, particularly as many EU member states have more experience with Russian interference. In response, the EU has tasked part of the EEAS East StratCom Task Force to focus on PRC-related FIMI. The European Parliament established the INGE special committee to address foreign interference in democratic processes. These initiatives involve collaboration with researchers, civil society, and international partners.

Additionally, EU institutions are actively engaging a variety of actors, supporting the establishment of a network of experts dedicated to the wider field of FIMI. Activities include conferences with researchers as well as intra-institutional cybersecurity exercises or the extension of funding for the European Digital

²⁵ European Commission, 'Report on the implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation', June 2019, [online](#).

²⁶ European Union External Action, '2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats', January 2024, [online](#).



Media Observatory (EDMO) that provides research and other resources on media literacy. The EEAS itself runs the EUvsDisinfo flagship project that includes a website dedicated to China, providing relevant information and a database of campaigns in a more accessible format.²⁷ It will be important to further strengthen these initiatives.

Measures taken in recent years constitute an improvement of institutional readiness and a strengthened legal framework. This shows that the EU has made significant progress especially through top-down approaches. To increase effectiveness, stronger and more effective bottom-up measures are necessary in order to sustainably increase awareness and readiness throughout society and empower citizens to better manage and counter information manipulation. Outstanding vulnerabilities leave democratic processes and societal discourse vulnerable to foreign interference. Taiwan's experience offers valuable lessons, provided the EU first invests in better understanding its experience, and identifies elements that can inspire the EU's own response.

Recommendations

We recommend the EU to consider the following:

1. Raise awareness of Taiwan's experience with disinformation

- The Policy, Strategy and Global Priority Issues Team (PSG) responsible for strategy and policy development, emerging threats, and cooperation with member states and international partners as well as other stakeholders, within the EEAS Strategic Communication Division, should consider establishing a specific Taiwan focus in its work, with the aim to gain a more comprehensive, in-depth and up-to-date understanding of Taiwan's whole-of-society response to PRC-affiliated disinformation campaigns.
- The PSG Team should consider establishing a consultation mechanism with relevant Taiwanese CSOs and experts, and explore how to incorporate Taiwan's experience.

2. Strengthen the EU's counter-disinformation capacity with Taiwan as inspiration

²⁷ <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>



- Explore how increased awareness of Taiwan's experience with disinformation and tangible lessons from Taiwan can contribute to strengthening the EU's FIMI Toolbox, in particular in the dimension of Resilience Building, as well as the FIMI-Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC).

3. Seek EU-Taiwan cooperation for local solutions

- Explore how to integrate member states into the consultation mechanism with Taiwanese CSOs and experts, in order to jointly explore solutions in accordance with the local context in European member states and Taiwan.