When announcing the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement in 2018, then-President of the European Council Donald Tusk declared the significance of the bilateral partnership in stark terms: “Politically, it’s a light in the increasing darkness of international politics”.1 In 2018, it was the protectionism of the first Trump administration that mainly prompted Tusk to claim that Japan and the EU were now the flag-bearers of free trade.
That sense of doom and gloom has now become even more pervasive in the field of defence and security, particularly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the intensification of Chinese military activity around Taiwan. On 1 November 2024, Japan and the EU released their first-ever document titled “Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership”. This landmark milestone in the so-called “golden era”2 of EU-Japan relations was accompanied by a high-profile visit to Tokyo by H.E. Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission. During his stay in Tokyo, H.E. Borrell Fontelles also held the 1st Japan-EU Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue with Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi. Japan has now become the first Indo-Pacific country to sign a Security and Defence Partnership with the EU. Outlining the rationale behind the agreement, which he called “historical and very timely”, H.E. Borrell stated that “We live in a very dangerous world… Given the situation in both of our regions, this political framework deepens our ability to tackle emerging threats together”.3
Both the document and the strategic dialogue indicate a closer strategic alignment between Tokyo and Brussels and a shared desire for enhanced strategic cooperation. The EU now considers China a “systemic rival”, while Japan regards it as its “greatest strategic challenge” since 1945. With the wind seemingly behind the sails of the Japan-EU security and defence partnership, the document points to several areas of cooperation that could inject further momentum: joint military exercises; defence cooperation agreements; and defence industrial collaboration.
Expanding Japan-EU Military Exercises
Article 12 of the document states that Japan and the EU will work towards “promoting concrete naval cooperation, including through the Administrative Arrangement between the EU’s Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (Joint Staff)”. Concrete activities such as joint exercises and port calls as well as participation of third countries were highlighted. The destroyers of EUNAVFOR and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) deployed on counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden have already been conducting maritime exercises since 2014.4 These are usually based on the scenario of an anti-piracy operation and include boarding of a vessel, cross-deck helicopter landings, complex tactical evolutions and a joint patrol. The JMSDF Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) unit involved in previous EU-Japan exercises usually consists of a single destroyer training together with one or two counterpart frigates from EU member states’ naval forces participating in EU NAVFOR. In June 2020, this exercise involved the Spanish Navy frigates Numancia and Santa Maria and the JSMSDF destroyer JS Onami. Japan and the EU have also conducted joint port calls in Djibouti followed by trilateral exercises in 2021 involving, for the first time, JMSDF, the EUNAVFOR and the Djibouti Navy and Coast Guard.
Under the new partnership document, opportunities for further expanding such joint EU-Japan activities could be explored. For instance, there could be joint visits to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Operational Coordination Centre in the Seychelles, which are “non-executive tasks” in the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta mandate. The earlier Japan-EU 2023 Summit joint statement also specifically mentioned exploring opportunities for “joint exercises in the Indo-Pacific”.5
With these prior exercises in mind, it is likely that the EU and Japan will aim for more regularised and frequent exercises on a larger scale, possibly involving more assets together with more complex exercise scenarios. As mentioned earlier, the EU-Japan bilateral exercises so far have involved the EUNAVFOR and the JMSDF Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) patrolling the Indian Ocean. Another opportunity exists with the JMSDF’s annual long-range deployment known as the Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) that conducts port calls and training exercises through the Indo-Pacific. This usually consists of several surface units such as helicopter carriers, destroyers, and occasionally a submarine. While the IPD has been conducted since 2017 and visited ports in India and Sri Lanka, IPD units have not yet exercised with the EUNAVFOR. The new EU-Japan strategic partnership’s mention of exercises may give more impetus to planning for a future IPD-EUNAVFOR exercise to materialise in the Indian Ocean region. However, the EUNAVFOR mandate remains limited to the north-west Indian Ocean in geographical terms. In order for the area of operations to be further expanded eastwards into the Indo-Pacific, this would potentially require a revision of the EUNAVFOR mandate by Brussels and EU member states.
Defence Cooperation Agreements
The new document specifically focused on security and defence cooperation is a significant addition to other previous documents that Japan has inked with the EU. These include the landmark EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreements (entered into force on 1 February 2019) and Strategic Partnership Agreements with the EU (provisionally entered into force on 1 February 2019, formally on 1 January 2025). Lower-level defence cooperation documents have already been signed prior to the high-level strategic partnership document. In March 2023, both Japan and the EU signed off on a new Administrative Arrangement for communication and coordination on joint anti-piracy exercises between the EUNAVFOR and the JMSDF.
Examining the evolution of Japan’s defence cooperation with European powers over the years, the specific types of agreements that Japan signs with its partners have been an important enabler. These agreements not only inject momentum into the cooperation, they also outline specific areas and domains of cooperation and alignment that can lead to further concrete outcomes in the future.6
As such, what is noteworthy in the partnership document is Article 7 which states that “the EU and Japan will explore the possibility of a Japan-EU Agreement on the Security of Information”. This seems to fit a pattern of deepening Japanese defence cooperation with European states over the past decade that is marked by successful negotiation and signature of such agreements. If successfully negotiated and signed, the information security agreement may then pave the way for further potential agreements such as on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, and on Acquisition and Cross-Servicing (ACSA). To further streamline and deepen military exercises between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the EU, the ACSA would be particularly valuable as it provides a pre-agreed framework allowing for reciprocal logistical support such as providing fuel, water and other supplies to each other’s military units. Any future agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology is also a key enabler for important defence industrial cooperation projects, a point discussed in the next section.
Defence Industrial Collaboration
Another eye-catching component of the document is Article 24 which states “The EU and Japan will conduct consultations on the development of respective defence initiatives including the exchange of information on defence industry-related matters. Japan and the EU will explore possible mutual involvement in respective defence initiatives in line with the respective processes.“ This agenda item again speaks to the ever-closer strategic alignment between the EU and Japan. In particular, defence industrial collaboration reflects a convergence of both parties with regards to shared concerns over maintaining a viable defence industrial base, in the face of lessons learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fears over Chinese revanchism in the Indo-Pacific. Despite the focus on how technologies such as AI and drones are transforming warfare in the 21st century, old-fashioned mass and quantity can still deliver effects on the battlefield. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has emphasised, “the whole of NATO, from California up to and including Ankara, is in terms of ammunition producing in a full year what Russia is producing in three months”. The US and its allies share similar fears of rapidly depleting their arsenals in a high-tempo war with China.
Then-Japanese PM Kishida Fumio repeatedly warned that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”, a fear that was echoed at the 1st Japan-EU Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue “that the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable”. Thanks to the then Kishida administration’s decision to commit to a Defence Build-Up Programme (DBP) in 2022,7 Japanese defence manufacturers enjoyed a bumper year in 2023. Figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that defence-related revenue at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries rose by 24% in 2023. In the process, Japan’s top defence manufacturer moved up six places to 39th in the SIPRI’s global ranking of Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies. The other Japanese companies ranked within SIPRI’s Top 100 include Kawasaki Heavy Industries (65th); Fujitsu (71st); NEC (91st); and Mitsubishi Electric (96th). NEC and Mitsubishi Electric are new entrants.8
Meanwhile, the EU for its part has launched the European Defence Agency together with a European Defence Fund (EDF), all with an eye to revitalising European defence industries. While the EDF is of course rightly targeted at EU member states, there are opportunities for third countries or companies from third countries. In fact, it is permissible for companies located in Europe but controlled by third countries to benefit from Community support subject to certain conditions. A company located in a third country can also cooperate with European companies subject to similar conditions but cannot be beneficiary of the Fund. One of the EDF precursor programmes, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme actually granted funding in 2019/2020 to 10 entities controlled by third-countries or third-countries entities from India, Israel, Japan, Oman, Switzerland and the United States.9 NTT Data Spain with the parent company in Japan being NTT Data, has participated in the EU-funded KOIOS project on developing robust and frugal AI applications in defense sectors. This suggests that even though Japan is not a EU member state, room does exist within the EDF framework for further collaboration with Japanese defence firms.
Japan was also the first non-European country to be granted observer status in the ongoing Eurodrone programme managed by the European Intergovernmental Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). Led by Airbus, Dassault and Leonardo, the Eurodrone programme emphasises mission modularity for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Agreements on rail gun development have also been signed between Japan, France, and Germany. Most notably, Japan has also launched the ambitious Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with Italy and the UK.
Japan does bring important capabilities to defence industrial collaboration. For instance, it has expertise in developing the world’s first missile radar seeker with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) in the AAM-4B air-to-air missile built by Mitsubushi Electric. The UK and Japan have collaborated on a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM) programme, which explored adapting the AAM-4B’s seeker head onto the Meteor missile built by European missile manufacturer MBDA. Japanese defence giant Mitsubushi Heavy Industries has also flight-tested an upgraded Type 12 surface-to-surface missile with an extended range of up to 1,000 kilometers and upgraded real-time satellite data links for targeting and guidance. Japan’s ongoing development of its missile capabilities may well provide a synergistic platform for collaboration with ongoing European missile initiatives such as MBDA designing a new Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapons (FC/ASW) long-range cruise missile to replace the British Storm Shadow/ Scalp in UK/French service.
Both sides may also encourage their defence manufacturers to more actively participate in defence industry exhibitions held in the EU or Japan. There remains a need to grow awareness and presence of Japanese expertise in defence fields. For instance, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japan Radio Co Ltd have exhibited their latest products at previous iterations of the major European naval arms exhibition, EuroNaval. But more manufacturers from Japan can utilise this platform and others such as Eurosatory exhibition to build relationships and gather information on potential sales opportunities. Likewise, major defence industry events such as the Japan International Aerospace Exhibition and DSEI Japan already offer important platforms for EU-based manufacturers to develop ties and build collaborations with Japanese counterparts.
Conclusion
As Russia’s brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine continues to cast a gloom over international politics, its so-called “no limits” partnership with China and Beijing’s intensifying rhetoric and military activity around Taiwan constitute the strategic background to the new EU-Japan Defence and Security Partnership document. Both the EU and Japan have much to do to put their own houses in order if the partnership is to move forward. This includes examining rules and regulations on defence industrial cooperation and exports as well as operational mandates for joint exercises. While there are no illusions in Brussels and Tokyo that this partnership can lift the gloom on its own, the document signifies political will as well as desire to uphold the rules-based international order. To provide the critical means to achieve these strategic goals, the three areas of defence cooperation outlined (joint exercises; defence cooperation agreements; defence industry collaboration), while not revolutionary, are timely and important evolutionary steps.
Daniel Boffey, “Japan-EU trade deal ‘light in darkness’ amid Trump’s protectionism Politically, it’s a light in the increasing darkness of international politics”, Guardian, 17 July 2018.↩︎
Jean De Ruyt, “The golden era of EU-Japan relations dawns”, Politico, 13 February 2023.↩︎
Chung-Hsi Tu, “Japan, EU sign defense pact fueled by threats from China, Russia”, VOA News, 1 Nov 2024.↩︎
Ministry of Defense Japan, “Joint Japan-EU Naval Force Anti-Piracy Exercise with Spanish Navy“, Japan Defense Focus, No. 126, August 2020.↩︎
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Joint Statement, Japan-EU Summit 2023”.↩︎
See for instance Nanae Baldauff & Yee-Kuang Heng, “Evaluating Japan’s defense cooperation agreements and their transformative potential: upgrading strategic partnerships with Australia and the UK”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 24, Issue 2, May 2024, Pages 183–215.↩︎
Ministry of Defense Japan, “Defense Buildup Program”, 16 December 2022.↩︎
Junnosuke Kobara, “South Korea and Japan arms industries grow nearly as fast as Russia’s”, Nikkei Asia, 2 December 2024.↩︎
EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, “Defense Industrial cooperation”, 2025.↩︎