China’s military expansion in the Pacific has reached a new level of assertiveness with the February 2025 combat exercises1 conducted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Tasman Sea. This unexpected move caught Australia, New Zealand, and other regional stakeholders off guard, disrupting air traffic for three days and raising significant security concerns.2 This recent incident is part of China’s broader, long-term strategy driven by hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing has been steadily reinforcing its presence through infrastructure development and growing security influence across the Pacific islands.3
China’s military activities near Australia highlight Beijing’s growing reconnaissance capabilities and dual-use influence in the region：
- In February 2022, Chinese warships targeted a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft with a military-grade laser.4 The aircraft was conducting routine surveillance in Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arafura Sea. China’s military personnel illuminated the aircraft, which Australia’s Department of Defence deemed dangerous and unprecedented. The RAAF was operating within international law under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s actions raised concerns about its aggressive military posture and willingness to interfere with surveillance operations. China has previously targeted U.S. aircraft with lasers in Djibouti.5
- In July 2023, China deployed a Dongdiao-class (Type 815) intelligence-gathering ship off the Central Queensland Coast during the large-scale multinational military exercise Talisman Sabre.6 Chinese military personnel used the vessel to monitor allied operations, employing its advanced radar and communications intelligence systems. The ship remained within Australia’s EEZ but outside territorial waters. China’s deployment reflects its strategy of closely surveilling military exercises involving U.S., Australian, and allied forces. This underscores China’s growing intelligence capabilities and interest in regional power dynamics.
- On September 25, 2024, China fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a dummy warhead into the Pacific Ocean, demonstrating an enhanced command of the situational awareness and positional data.7
- The October 2024 arrival of Chinese warships in Port Vila, Vanuatu further underscores this expanding military reach, marking the first known deployment of Type 055 Xianyang (108) and Type 052D Nanning (162) destroyers to the Pacific.8
These developments all reflect a deliberate strategy to strengthen China’s military footprint and multiply its influence in a region of increasing geopolitical significance.
To unpack China’s military presence and security interests in the Pacific, this policy paper suggests bringing China’s dual-use facilities, which not only serve civilian functions, but also support military purposes, strengthen the PLA’s power projection, and have the potential to disrupt joint mobilization among regional actors—into context. China’s military reach is inconspicuous, embedded via its foreign investments and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. Although research on the BRI has grown since 2013, most studies have focused on its economic and foreign aid aspects, often overlooking its security and military implications.
This paper explores whether China is preparing to weaponise its infrastructure in the Pacific to extend its hard power presence. It first analyses the strategic nature of the BRI in the region, arguing that China’s geopolitical ambitions outweigh its economic objectives. The paper then identifies four key categories of strategic infrastructure: ports and wharves, fishery facilities, aeronautical hubs, and information and communications technology (ICT) networks. Finally, it explores the tactical impacts and investigates China’s strategic use of dual-use infrastructures.
The paper argues that China’s development projects in the Pacific serve as undercover infrastructures supporting the PLA’s power projection toward the Third Island Chain. Far from being driven solely by economic interests, these infrastructure projects seek to multiply China’s strategic influence through dual-use software, hardware, and a broader Chinese-built ecosystem. These assets could be weaponised in the transition from peace to war, limiting regional actors’ freedom of action and enabling China to achieve its strategic objectives.
This report is timely, as Chinese companies bid for Ukraine’s infrastructure reconstruction and Pacific countries like the Cook Islands9 are signing on to new dual-use projects. It maps out the security risks of BRI projects and explores the correlation between Chinese dual-use infrastructure and the expanded Chinese military presence.
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Anne-Marie Brady, ‘New Zealand’s stark choice: Navigating uncharted waters’, The Press, 13 March 2025, online.↩︎
‘A shot across the bow: China signals new era of sea power in the South West Pacific’, The Diplomat, 27 February 2025, online.↩︎
Andrew Hampton, ‘The importance of intelligence cooperation with the Pacific’, NZSIS, 7 March 2025, online.↩︎
‘Chinese ship lasing of P-8A Poseidon on 17 February 2022’, Australian Government, 22 February, 2022, online.↩︎
Jim Garamone, ‘U.S. Protests Chinese Interference With U.S. Planes in Djibouti’, U.S. Department of Defense, 3 March 2018, online.↩︎
Ridzwan Rahmat, ‘Australia Releases Image of Chinese Intelligence Ship amid Major Exercise’, JANES, 25 July 2023, online.↩︎
Nectar Gan, ‘China fires ICBM into Pacific Ocean in first such public test in decades as regional tensions flare’, CNN, 26 September 2024, online; Hui Zhang, ‘China’s openness about its latest nuclear missile test shows growing confidence vis-à-vis the United States’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 October 2024, online.↩︎
‘China Type 055 destroyer Xianyang makes first-ever South Pacific deployment to Vanuatu”, Army Recognition, 21 October 2024, online.↩︎
Anne-Marie Brady, ‘Cook Islands China shock a frog in the pot moment for Pacific security’, The Diplomat, 18 February 2025, online; Olena Goncharova, ‘China signals willingness to aid Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction’, The Kyiv Independent, 19 March 2025, online.↩︎