- The rapid escalation of tensions in Japan–China relations following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Diet explanation regarding a “survival-threatening situation” (存立危機事態, sonritsu kiki jitai) can be understood as the outcome of the Xi Jinping leadership launching a pre-prepared cognitive warfare campaign—here referred to as a “Special Cognitive Warfare Operation: SCO”—after recognizing her statement as a strategic opportunity. Even though her explanation did not in any way refer to “Japan’s intervention in a Taiwan contingency” or “abandoning the One-China policy,” among other claims, the Xi administration utilized an opportunity to urge the Takaichi administration to refrain from interfering in the Taiwan issue.
- However, this escalation of tensions should be understood not simply as a consequence of a politician’s remarks, but rather as the result of the international structural conditions and domestic variables confronting both countries. Given the interaction of domestic variables on both sides, leaders’ perceptions of the international structure, and the shrinking number of bilateral political dialogue channels, it will be difficult to establish conditions conducive to de-escalation. Amid a broader structural tension between authoritarian and liberal orders, it is highly likely that the combination of a comparatively steady continuation of economic and trade relations and persistent political strain will become a long-term “new normal” in Japan–China relations.
- It would be dangerous to feel reassured simply because the situation does not escalate beyond “diplomatic warfare.” The discourses mobilized by China in this episode suggest that its ultimate objectives include: legitimizing various punitive measures against a “militarizing” Japan by invoking instruments such as the “enemy state clauses,” and neutralizing and incapacitating Okinawa—Japan’s and the United States’ most critical military hub in a Taiwan contingency—through the “Three Warfares” (i.e., (1) public opinion warfare, (2) psychological warfare, and (3) legal warfare). This should be understood as part of preparations for an eventual “annexation of Taiwan.”
- Accordingly, what is required of us is: to understand the Chinese leadership’s assessment of the international situation and its strategic orientation; to cooperate with European states facing analogous challenges from Russia, as well as like-minded Indo-Pacific partners, in responding to and deterring attempts—centered on China and Russia—to change the status quo by force and to challenge the rules-based international order; and to communicate carefully to the international community the costs and repercussions that authoritarian attempts at unilateral change impose on the global economy.
1. The Substance of Prime Minister Takaichi’s Statement in the House of Representatives
On 7 November, during a session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Prime Minister Takaichi responded to questions concerning the government’s understanding of a “survival-threatening situation” (存立危機事態, sonritsu kiki jitai), which constitutes one of the conditions under which Japan may exercise its right of self-defense. In doing so, she cited a hypothetical scenario involving an attack on Taiwan as an illustrative example. At no point, however, did Prime Minister Takaichi state that “Japan would militarily intervene in a Taiwan contingency,” nor did she suggest that Japan would “abandon the One-China policy.” Nevertheless, China categorically characterized this response as a “declaration of Japan’s intervention in a Taiwan contingency” and demanded that the statement be retracted, claiming that it had “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” Such assertions constitute a distortion unsupported by facts and represent a deliberate misinterpretation exploited as convenient material for China’s cognitive warfare, far removed from the original meaning and context of the remarks. In this section, Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary response is examined on the basis of Japanese-language transcript of the exchange published on the website of the questioner, Katsuya Okada, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan.
During the Budget Committee session, Mr. Okada questioned the Prime Minister regarding the government’s understanding of the concept of a “survival-threatening situation,” one of the three conditions under which Japan may exercise the right of self-defense. In particular, he pointed out the ambiguity inherent in the definition of this concept and noted that, when compared with an “armed attack situation” (武力攻撃事態)—defined as the occurrence of a direct armed attack against Japan—it grants the government considerably broader discretion in determining its applicability. He then asked the Prime Minister to clarify the government’s interpretation of these issues.
In the post–Second World War period, Japan, under Article 9 of the Constitution—which stipulates the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes and the non-possession of war potential—has interpreted the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, which entails involvement in another country’s war, as unconstitutional, despite Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizing both individual and collective self-defense as rights of UN member states. At the same time, successive Japanese governments have maintained that the right of individual self-defense, exercised to protect the nation’s people, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, is inherent to Japan as a UN member state and therefore may be exercised (as reflected, for example, in the 1972 opinion of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau). On this basis, the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces as the minimum necessary level of defensive capability has been interpreted as constitutional.
Nonetheless, the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces—namely, the exercise of the right of individual self-defense—has been subject to stringent constraints. These were codified in three conditions: (1) the occurrence of a direct armed attack against Japan; (2) the absence of other appropriate means to repel the attack; and (3) the limitation of the use of force to the minimum necessary level. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to state that Japan’s postwar pacifist political system developed around the central question of how to deny and restrict military power, and in particular the use of military force.
From the late 1990s onward, however, as China rapidly expanded its military capabilities—surpassing Japan’s defense budget in military-related expenditures by 2005—and as the operational reach of the People’s Liberation Army extended beyond China’s coastal areas past the First Island Chain into the western Pacific, the reality of Japan’s relative inferiority vis-à-vis China in defense capabilities came to be increasingly shared within the Japanese government.
As a consequence, Japan’s security legislation establishes a graduated framework, ranging from (i) an armed attack situation (武力攻撃事態, buryoku kōgeki jitai) under the Armed Attack Situation Act enacted in 2003; to (ii) a survival-threatening situation (存立危機事態, sonritsu kiki jitai), which applies when an armed attack against a country with close ties to Japan poses a serious threat to Japan’s survival and was institutionalized through the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation following the Abe administration’s July 2014 Cabinet decision revising the interpretation of the first of the three constitutional conditions; and (iii) an important influence situation on Japan’s peace and security (重要影響事態, jūyō eikyō jitai), governed by the Act on Important Influence Situation to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan, originally enacted as the 1999 Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Act and comprehensively revised in 2015.
The Armed Attack Situation Act was introduced in the early 2000s against the backdrop of the post-9/11 security environment and growing concerns over North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, providing a legal basis for the use of force in defense of Japan itself. The category of a survival-threatening situation was added through the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation following a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, enabling the limited exercise of collective self-defense when an attack on a closely related state poses a clear threat to Japan’s survival. Meanwhile, the legal framework for situations having an important influence on Japan’s peace and security evolved from the 1999 legislation on situations in areas surrounding Japan, and was revised in 2015 to remove geographic constraints and allow broader non-combat logistical support for allied forces.
Within this framework, the Cabinet determines the applicable category of situation, subject to Diet oversight, and, as a result, delineates the permissible scope of activities that the Self-Defense Forces may undertake. This scope ranges from (i) the exercise of individual self-defense for the defense of Japan, through (ii) the exercise of collective self-defense—primarily aimed at the defense of Japan in cooperation with allied states, most notably the United States—to (iii) non-combat logistical and rear-area support. Mr. Okada’s question concerned the second of these categories, namely the survival-threatening situation.
In response to Mr. Okada’s question, P.M. Takaichi prefaced her remarks by stating that “all possibilities and worst-case scenarios must be assumed.” She then pointed to scenarios in which China, in seeking to bring Taiwan under its control, might employ measures such as sea lane blockades, disinformation, and cyber propaganda, as well as scenarios involving the actual use of armed force. She argued that the use of military force in the vicinity of Taiwan could have a serious impact on Japan’s security and could therefore constitute a survival-threatening situation.
Two points warrant particular attention here. First, Prime Minister Takaichi emphasized that “the consistent position of the Japanese government has been that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue.” Second, she explained that any use of force by the Self-Defense Forces must conform to Article 88 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, that “the use of force for the defense of Japan must not exceed the extent deemed necessary,” and clarified that a survival-threatening situation constitutes a condition for the use of force for Japan’s defense. She further stated that “it is not possible to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces to another country for the purpose of defending that country.” In other words, what is envisaged here is not the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or to defend Taiwan—a prospect anticipated by some of Taiwanese society—but rather support for U.S. forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency. More importantly, from a legal standpoint, Taiwan is not recognized as an independent state; as a result, domestic debates in Japan concerning a Taiwan contingency, as well as discussions on security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, have not progressed beyond this point.
It has been noted that the National Security Strategy (国家安全保障戦略) adopted by Kishida administration’s Cabinet decision in December 2022 embraces an approach characterized as a “denial strategy and competitive strategy premised on inferiority vis-à-vis China.” This approach combines a strategy of denial—designed to convince Beijing, through the development of stand-off defense capabilities such as cruise missiles, and cross-domain asymmetric superiority by combining dominance in the electronic warfare domain with emerging domains such as space, cyber, unmanned systems, and directed-energy weapons, that the costs of attempting to change the status quo by force would outweigh any potential gains—with a competitive strategy, aimed at prevailing in long-term competition by undermining the foundations of a rival’s power, forcing it to squander resources in areas of comparative disadvantage, and imposing the costs of expansionist policies in order to preserve advantages in security, economic strength, and political foundations.
At the same time, there exists within Japan a perception that the shift in U.S. policy from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” regarding Taiwan—evident in the Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy and its Taiwan-related policies including $10b weapons package for Taiwan—would mean that, should U.S. forces act in a Taiwan contingency, Japan would be required to provide protection and logistic support to U.S. forces in no-combat zone under the Act on Important Influence Situation (Japanese), or survival-threatening situation. As a result, Japan would inevitably be drawn into a Taiwan contingency.
Attempts to change the status quo with respect to Taiwan through the use of force would have severe consequences not only for Japan, but also for the security and economies of the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, profoundly affecting regional and global stability and economic activity. As demonstrated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the use of military force involving physical destruction results in the loss of countless lives, the separation of families, regional destabilization, and the forfeiture of economic benefits that might otherwise be expected under conditions of stability. From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi’s explanation—that it is both legitimate and necessary for a sovereign state to continue diplomatic efforts to deter Beijing from resorting to force and to avoid armed conflict, while simultaneously preparing for worst-case scenarios—deserves recognition. At the same time, the political significance of her being the first prime minister to articulate this awareness explicitly is substantial, and debates over its implications continue within Japan.
2. Internal and External Variables Shaping the Perceptions of the Chinese Leadership
The Chinese government has interpreted Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary response as a “declaration of Japan’s intervention in a Taiwan contingency” and has demanded its retraction on the grounds that it “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” As already noted, however, Prime Minister Takaichi made no such statement. Rather, this episode should be understood as reflecting a strategic necessity for Chinese political actors—derived from both the international environment surrounding China (external variables) and China’s domestic conditions (internal variables)—to mobilize nationwide criticism of Prime Minister Takaichi and the Japanese government, irrespective of the actual content of her remarks.
(1) External Variables: International Structure around PRC and Japan
Unlike Europe, the Indo-Pacific region lacks a regional collective defense organization comparable to NATO. Instead, it has traditionally been characterized by a “hub-and-spokes” security architecture, with the United States serving as the hub and bilateral defense treaties between the United States and Asian countries forming the spokes. In recent years, however, the expansion of China’s material military superiority, the growing need for defense cooperation among like-minded states to respond to this trend, and hedging behavior by regional actors against the inward-looking tendencies of the Trump administration have contributed to the revitalizing and deepening security cooperation in mini-laterals among the spokes themselves such as Indo-Pacific Four (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). As a result, the regional security architecture has gradually evolved from a hub-and-spokes model toward a more networked, or “lattice,” structure.
Equally significant is the increasing number of facilities and locations to which like-minded states can gain access in contingencies. The search for security cooperation beyond the United States—initiated during the Abe administration in parallel with strengthening the Japan–U.S. alliance—has been further reinforced under the Kishida and Takaichi administrations. In recent years, Japan has designated Australia as a “special strategic partner” and advanced a broad range of initiatives, including the signing and entry into force of the Japan–Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA); Australia’s decision to procure eleven Japanese-made upgraded Mogami-class frigates; Japanese support for Australia’s development of the MQ-28 Ghost Bat unmanned aerial vehicle to support manned platforms; participation in the “Maritime Big Play” acoustic communications experiment related to the operation of underwater drones under AUKUS Pillar II; the expansion of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises; and the holding of the Japan–U.S.–Australia Trilateral Defense Consultations (May 2025).
Japan has also advanced cooperation with the United Kingdom through the entry into force of the Japan–UK RAA and enhanced joint training. Relations with the Philippines have been strengthened through measures such as the entry into force of the Japan–Philippines RAA in September 2025, preparatory negotiations for a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and the transfer of defense equipment. Plans are also underway to convene a five-country defense ministers’ meeting involving Japan, the United States, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. In addition, relations with South Korea—an important strategic partner sharing values, rules, and interests—have begun to normalize, with the first defense ministers’ meeting since 2015 held in 2025. Beyond the Indo-Pacific, security cooperation with European countries has been strengthened through NATO–IP4 cooperation and frameworks involving the European Union. The trilateral Japan–UK–Italy sixth-generation fighter aircraft development project (GCAP) has also entered a concrete development phase with the establishment of the responsible development company, Edgewing. Furthermore, in October 2025 Australia concluded a defense alliance treaty with Papua New Guinea (the “PUKPUK Treaty”), and comprehensive security partnerships with Singapore have likewise been reinforced.
The Chinese government has viewed these developments with alarm and criticized them as constituting an “anti-China encirclement.” Yet these trends are, in fact, the cumulative result of China’s own rapid military expansion over nearly two decades—pursued without sufficient transparency—and the expansion and deepening of the China–Russia strategic partnership. Within this increasingly dense, multilayered security cooperation structure oriented toward China, Beijing appears to have regarded Japan—constrained domestically by postwar pacifism—as the “weakest link” most susceptible to pressure. Consequently, China, which places great emphasis on numerical advantage, has sought to label Japan as “militaristic” or as “challenging the postwar order” in an effort to induce Japan’s international isolation and degrade its external reputation.
According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, China has increased its military spending by 730% over the past 20 years. China’s defense budget for 2025 amounts to 1,784.665 billion renminbi (approximately USD 246.5 billion), representing a year-on-year increase of 7.2 percent. Using the provided figures, Japan’s FY2025 defense-related budget totals approximately USD 70.5 billion. On this basis, Japan’s FY2025 defense-related expenditures amount to roughly 28.6 percent of China’s budget.
The current state of naval force development of Japan and China is examined through a statistical comparison. Between 2023 and 2025, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) commissioned a total of 37,190 tons (standard displacement) of naval vessels. During the same period, Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned a total of 241,850 tons of naval vessels. In simple terms, even a comparison based solely on standard displacement yields a ratio of approximately 1 to 6.5 between the vessels commissioned by JMSDF and PLAN.
In addition to comparing displacement, it is also necessary to compare the number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells and anti-ship missiles (ASM) carried by each platform—namely, their so-called “lethality (offensive missile capacity).” Total number of VLS and ASM of above mentioned JMSDF vessels is 80 VLS cells and 40 ASMs. By contrast, total number of PLAN is 1,072 VLS cells and 40 ASMs. In sum, there exists a substantial offensive capability gap of 1 to 9.2 between Japanese and Chinese naval vessels commissioned over the past three years.
In recent years, China has increasingly engaged in assertive behavior backed by overwhelming material superiority in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and around Taiwan. This trend reflects not only a sense of superiority derived from hard power, including military and economic capabilities, but also an ethnocentric, Han-centered exceptionalist worldview rooted in Xi Jinping’s vision of the “China Dream,” which promotes the notion that “China is great.” Closely linked to this worldview is a popular sentiment that looks down on neighboring countries, encapsulated in the belief that “small states should simply comply with the wishes of great powers.” This sentiment has been clearly reflected in recent Sino-Japanese tensions, during which social media platforms were flooded with intimidatory posts boasting China’s military superiority and implicitly threatening the use of force associated with national pride of Chinese.
The Chinese government argues that China adheres to a defensive national defense policy and an active defense military strategy, and is advancing high-quality modernization of its national defense and armed forces solely to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, while consistently serving as a driving force for peace, stability, and progress in the world. However, the above-mentioned China’s rapid military buildup, the expanding geographical scope of the People’s Liberation Army’s activities, and the fusion of military power projection with rising Chinese national pride are perceived by neighboring societies as nothing other than a threat. In this regard, China—now possessing the world’s largest navy in numerical terms as well as the world’s largest coast guard—needs to take into account the “security dilemma” identified by Herz, whereby one state’s efforts to enhance its own security inevitably generate insecurity for others.
Contemporary Japan, however, is embedded in a multilateral cooperation framework with numerous states that share values, rules, and interests. Moreover, through sustained confidence-building efforts—such as the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific FOIP” (自由で開かれたインド太平洋) vision, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), and bilateral official development assistance (ODA)—Japan has cultivated long-term trust. As a result, attempts to brand Japan with the image of “militarism” from 80 years ago have found little resonance internationally.
(2) Domestic variables in Japan
Japan’s slowing economic growth and demographic challenges—particularly population aging and decline—have contributed to a relative erosion of its overall national power, implying a reduced capacity to manage China independently. Under conditions of China’s overwhelming military superiority, the Takaichi administration has therefore prioritized strengthening relations with the United States to ensure Japan’s defense. From Beijing’s perspective, a pro-Taiwan administration led by Prime Minister Takaichi—reflecting former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s emphasis on Taiwan and actively supporting causes such as Uyghur and Tibetan human rights—may have been viewed as a government over which China could not readily exert influence. This concern was likely heightened by the formation of a right-leaning coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP).
Prime Minister Takaichi had previously criticized the former LDP–Komeito coalition governments as being overly accommodating toward China. Historically, when LDP politicians sought to revise policies related to constitutional reform or arms export principles, Komeito—self-identifying as the “party of peace”—had opposed such moves, leading to more moderate (or, from another perspective, insufficient) policy outcomes. Komeito’s departure from the coalition and the formation of a new coalition with the JIP, which tolerates debate on constitutional revision and even nuclear armament, may have led Beijing to conclude that the institutional foundations of postwar pacifism in Japan were likely to undergo more substantial revision.
This perception has been reinforced by domestic political trends. In the July 2025 House of Councillors election, the right-wing populist party Sanseitō—which denies Japan’s war responsibility by rejecting the characterization of the Pacific War as a war of aggression and promotes a xenophobic “Japanese First” agenda—made significant gains. As a result, other parties, including the LDP, have faced pressure to adopt more populist positions in order to retain public support.
The reduction of political dialogue channels between Japan and China has further contributed to the protraction of tensions. Toshihiro Nikai, a veteran LDP politician who served as party secretary-general for a record five years and two months under the second Abe and Suga administrations and who long maintained close ties with China as head of the Japan–China Friendship Parliamentarians’ Union, retired in October 2024. His departure significantly reduced channels of political dialogue between the LDP and the Chinese government. In addition, Komeito’s exit from the coalition deprived the Takaichi administration of political figures whom Beijing recognized as interlocutors. Notably, the first Japanese politician to meet Xi Jinping after his assumption of the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 was Natsuo Yamaguchi, then leader of Komeito (who stepped down in September 2024 and announced his retirement from politics on 20 June 2025).
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to conclude that Beijing had prepared a carefully calibrated cognitive warfare campaign aimed at deterring the Takaichi administration and was waiting for an opportunity to activate it. The immediate triggers likely included Prime Minister Takaichi’s expression of serious concern directly to President Xi Jinping at the Takaichi–Xi summit on 31 October 2025 regarding the situations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—both widely criticized internationally for restrictions on freedom of expression and human rights violations (similar concerns had also been raised by Prime Minister Abe during his December 2019 visit to China)—as well as Prime Minister Takaichi’s informal meeting with Lin Hsin-yi, Taiwan’s APEC representative and former vice premier, during the APEC summit. These actions appear to have prompted expressions of dissatisfaction and the punitive deployment of a “special cognitive warfare operation.”
(3) Domestic Variables in PRC
For the Xi Jinping administration, which faces a deteriorating domestic economic environment and increasingly unstable relations with the military following the detention of numerous senior officers under anti-corruption campaigns, the creation of an external “enemy” offers a means of tightening domestic control and fostering internal cohesion. Under Xi, anti-Japanese education and Han-centric “Chinese Dream” nationalism have been intensified, making anti-Japanese sentiment one of the most effective tools for mobilizing popular nationalism.
China’s economy in 2025 maintained nominal growth rates close to official targets, yet continued weakness in domestic demand resulted in significant distortions in the quality of growth. Real GDP growth, which remained in the mid–5 percent range at the beginning of the year, decelerated to the high–4 percent range in the latter half. Persistent demand weakness was evident in price trends, with the consumer price index remaining broadly flat throughout the year and deflationary pressures not fully dispelled. External demand, by contrast, remained relatively robust, and the trade surplus expanded to a record level amid rising exports and subdued imports. This outcome, however, also reflected stagnation in domestic consumption and investment rather than a healthy rebalancing toward domestic demand. Indeed, retail sales growth slowed markedly in the second half of the year, underscoring weak household consumption sentiment.
The underlying causes of this malaise include the impact of tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, the prolonged adjustment of the real estate sector, high debt levels among local governments and corporations, weak employment conditions and future expectations, and a more cautious stance toward investment in China. Real estate development investment continued to decline sharply year on year, with both new starts and sales area posting double-digit decreases, effectively stripping the sector of its former role as a growth engine. The resulting decline in land revenues has strained local government finances, constraining public investment and social spending. While headline urban unemployment rates have remained superficially stable, youth unemployment (16.9 percent in November) remains elevated, dampening consumption through heightened future uncertainty. Structural factors—such as labor-saving technologies driven by AI and robotics—also point to the likelihood of further increases in unemployment. In addition, inward foreign direct investment remained below the previous year’s level, reflecting sustained caution among foreign firms.
Relations between Xi Jinping and the military have also drawn increasing scrutiny. Although Xi consolidated an unprecedentedly centralized “one-man dominance” system at the start of his third term in 2022—appointing loyalists throughout the leadership and the military—serious fractures have nonetheless emerged. In late October, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the expulsion from the Communist Party and the military of nine senior figures, including He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the second-ranking uniformed officer, and Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, citing “serious violations of party discipline and major criminal offenses.” He Weidong, a close confidant of Xi, had been promoted after successfully overseeing the August 2022 “Taiwan blockade exercises” as commander of the Eastern Theater Command following then–U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. He thus became the first sitting Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to be purged. The detention of numerous senior officers, including members of the Central Military Commission, under the banner of anti-corruption has inevitably destabilized civil–military relations. While some argue that the removal of dissenting voices has strengthened Xi’s personal dictatorship, it is difficult to deny that command capacity for large-scale military operations has been impaired.
Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary statements formed part of a domestic legal and constitutional debate, were internally consistent, and were followed by high domestic approval ratings, making retraction politically infeasible for her administration. At the same time, the Xi administration—having escalated its rhetoric from “wolf warrior” calls for “beheading Prime Minister Takaichi” to explicit assertions of willingness to use military means to defend the “One China” principle and China’s “core interests” regarding Taiwan—cannot unilaterally retreat from its own posture. Nor are the structural factors driving the situation likely to change, China’s continued military expansion and militaristic tendencies, and the corresponding strengthening and deepening of regional security cooperation, including Japan, to ensure deterrence. Consequently, heightened tensions between Japan and China are likely to persist over the long term as a “new normal.”
3. China’s Implementation of a “Special Cognitive Warfare Operation: SCO”
The Chinese government unilaterally framed Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary response as a “pre-announcement of military intervention.” Within hours, in the afternoon of the same day, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian condemned the remarks by name at a regular press briefing in Beijing, labeling them “blatant interference in internal affairs” and “a serious challenge to China’s core interests,” and demanding an “immediate retraction and apology”—an unusually rapid initial reaction. This statement was immediately disseminated nationwide through state media such as CCTV and People’s Daily, setting the tone for subsequent messaging.
In the SCO, the Chinese government has pursued a multilayered form of “selective retaliation”: first, amplifying narratives of Japan’s “revival of militarism” through state media and social media via overseas propagandists; second, imposing economic coercion and suspending cultural and people-to-people exchanges in domains where the domestic economic costs to China are comparatively limited—such as travel advisories and renewed import bans on Japanese seafood; and third, at the United Nations, portraying Japan as a “challenger to the postwar international order,” while emphasizing claims such as the legality and feasibility of punitive measures against Japan under the so-called “enemy state clauses” even without Security Council authorization, and the alleged invalidity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
These measures reflect a hybrid approach grounded in the “Three Warfares,” (1) public opinion warfare, (2) psychological warfare, and (3) legal warfare, incorporated into the revised Regulations regarding political work in the PLA in December 2003. Hybrid warfare refers to the integrated use of diverse instruments to secure national interests and alter the status quo at a level below that of full-scale war involving physical destruction. This approach is also closely connected to “cognitive warfare,” which seeks to leverage superiority in the physical and information domains to exert influence in the cognitive domain—shaping perceptions, patterns of thought, and behavioral tendencies in ways favorable to the initiator.
The escalation process of the SCO thus became an important test case for analyzing China’s methods, actors, and auxiliary supporters in information warfare and cognitive-domain operations.
(1) Public Opinion Warfare
Public opinion warfare seeks to shape and control public opinion; at the domestic level, it is intended to bolster the morale of the population and military forces, whereas internationally it aims to erode the morale and willingness to resist of the adversary.
(i) The “Wolf Warrior” Style
On 7 November, Xue Jian, China’s Consul General in Osaka, posted on X that “We have no choice but to chop off that dirty head (of P.M. Takaichi) that has lunged at us without a moment’s hesitation. Are you ready?” This episode exemplified the use of “wolf warrior” diplomacy characterized by extreme intimidation and inflammatory rhetoric. An interesting fact is that Consul General Xue is regarded as a comparatively moderate and liberal Japan specialist, with deep familiarity with Japan, and formerly served as a Deputy Director-General in the Department of Asian Affairs in the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Precisely because of his background as a Japan expert, it is possible that structural factors exist that compel him to adopt more coercive or intimidating rhetoric toward Japan in order to demonstrate loyalty to Xi Jinping.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong protest by summoning the Chinese ambassador to Japan, and U.S. Ambassador to Japan George E. Glass likewise criticized the remarks as intimidation directed at the Japanese public and as revealing China’s true nature. Nonetheless, the Chinese government did not issue an official position regarding this inappropriate statement, although the post was deleted within hours after Japan’s protest.
Beyond Xue Jian’s post, Chen Binhua, spokesperson for the China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, issued a statement linking the episode to historical issues, asserting that Japan should bear criminal responsibility for “colonial rule over Taiwan for fifty years.” This represented a two-track propaganda approach: casting the Taiwan issue as purely an “internal affair,” while simultaneously degrading Japan as a “past aggressor.”
The purpose of such “wolf warrior” diplomacy is to project an image of strength, intimidate the counterpart, and thereby influence its behavioral patterns. In this sense, it reflects a complex emotional mix: a desire for recognition as a great power, resentment at continued perceived non-recognition, and confidence that China already constitutes a major power in the quantitative dimensions of hard power, such as military and economic capacity. Domestically, this can help perform “great China” narratives and satisfy nationalist sentiment; internationally, however, it tends to damage China’s image of “peaceful rise” and, if anything, clarifies which actor is moving in a more militaristic direction.
(ii) The Use of Social Media
Immediately after the operation began, China appears to have coordinated overseas social media platforms (notably X) with domestic platforms (notably Weibo), employing social bots to conduct rapid, large-volume narrative manipulation with the aim of dominating the “information and cognitive space” and shaping public opinion at home and abroad to its advantage. Within this dual dissemination strategy—spanning official and unofficial propaganda channels—the mobilization of China-based or China-aligned influencers operating on non-Chinese platforms was particularly conspicuous. This also provided a valuable opportunity to identify potential collaborators and to detect which bot networks might be deployed by China.
In China, access to Twitter (now X) has been blocked since the 2009 unrest in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on the grounds that it “threatens national security.” This restriction forms part of the internet censorship architecture commonly referred to as the “Great Firewall,” under which domestically censored platforms such as Weibo and WeChat are promoted as substitutes. As of 2025, this restriction remains in place: users in mainland China generally cannot access X without special tools such as VPNs. By contrast, users in Hong Kong and Macao, as well as Chinese nationals living abroad, can use X freely; and this “external propaganda” functioned as a key instrument in China’s information strategy following the Takaichi remarks.
The resulting posts—primarily disseminated via official accounts of Chinese embassies, consulates, and overseas bureaus of state media—have ranged widely, including diplomatic denunciations, military intimidation, attempts to degrade the image of Japanese society and culture, and justifications for a hardline posture toward Japan, often in English and other languages. In addition, online groups commonly described as the “wumao (the “50-cent party, 五毛黨),” allegedly paid to post content aligned with government narratives, as well as so-called “ziganwu (自干五)“—patriotic bloggers and influencers who post voluntarily without payment—also circulated strongly anti-Japanese claims and messages emphasizing China’s military superiority. By competing for visibility through ever-stronger anti-Japanese rhetoric, such actors may, in effect, further reinforce social perceptions of China’s military dominance and great-power identity within Chinese society.
In short, social media has functioned as a core tool in China’s approach to cognitive warfare (cognitive-domain operations), providing “initial firepower” against public cognitive networks in accordance with the logic of public opinion warfare and psychological warfare. By saturating the information space through high-frequency posting by automated accounts and the mass injection of emotionally charged messages, these operations aim to overwhelm human processing capacity at the agenda-setting stage, amplify preferred narratives, and bury dissenting voices—thus reshaping the “terrain” of the information environment itself. This reflects China’s understanding that “those who seize public opinion first win the information war.” Notably, China-affiliated accounts reportedly engaged in repeated duplicate postings in ways that violated X’s spam policies.
At the same time, it was also reported that Chinese authorities deleted posts expressing concern about deteriorating Japan–China relations—such as travel accounts emphasizing that “Japanese people are kind” or “highly cultivated,” or comments warning that “economic sanctions also harm Chinese firms” and that “peace is best.” The effect is that, domestically, only “belligerent” narratives remain visible, while pro-Japanese voices or concerns about economic self-harm are staged as if they “do not exist.”
(2) Psychological Warfare Through Economic and Cultural Restrictions
Psychological warfare aims to intimidate adversaries, undermine their morale, and disrupt the smooth functioning of enemy governmental institutions and command-and-control structures through a variety of instruments centered on information warfare, thereby ultimately breaking the enemy’s will to continue fighting.
On 14 November, Chinese embassy in Japan issued statement claiming that public security in Japan had become unstable and that crimes targeting Chinese nationals had become frequent, urging citizens to avoid travel to Japan “for the time being.” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rebutted these assertions on 21 November, citing National Police Agency statistics and arguing that reported incidents of homicide, robbery, and arson involving Chinese victims from 2023 through October 2025 showed a declining trend (the figures also include cases in which the principal suspect was identified as a Chinese national), and that the claim of “frequent” incidents was therefore unfounded. Following the travel advisory, major Chinese airlines reportedly began offering immediate free changes and refunds for Japan-bound tickets for the period from 15 November through 31 December, and Chinese owned South China Morning Post suggested that roughly 491,000 cancellations occurred, generating economic effects in Japan.
According to monthly statistics released by the Japan Tourism Agency and the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), inbound tourism to Japan continued to expand in both October and November 2025 on a year-on-year basis. In November 2025 alone, the number of inbound visitors reached approximately 3.518 million, while cumulative arrivals since the beginning of the year recorded an all-time high. By contrast, arrivals from mainland China amounted to approximately 562,600 in November 2025 and increased modestly year on year; however, the growth rate was limited to around 3 percent, and arrivals declined on a month-on-month basis, indicating a deceleration in growth. At the same time, inbound tourism from other source markets—including Taiwan, South Korea, and Western countries such as the United States and Canada—increased during the same period, thereby contributing to overall growth and underpinning the record-high cumulative number of visitors. In addition, impacts of restriction by Beijing concentrated on services catering primarily to Chinese tourists and operated by Chinese residents in Japan.
In addition, China’s General Administration of Customs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs re-imposed a showing of a comprehensive suspension of imports of Japanese seafood, again invoking the Fukushima treated water issue. China had previously imposed a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports on 24 August 2023, when the release of treated water from the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant began, citing “risks of radioactive contamination.” The Japanese government has countered by pointing to scientific data and meeting international safety standards and the assessment process conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The scientific basis of China’s measure has also been questioned, given that numerous Chinese fishing vessels continued operating in the Pacific off Fukushima during the period of the import ban and landed their catches in various parts of China.
After roughly two years of import suspension, China announced in June 2025—following bilateral negotiations—a policy decision to resume imports of Japanese seafood, and on 5 November 2025 exports of frozen scallops from Hokkaido to China reportedly resumed officially. However, only two weeks later, on the morning of 19 November 2025, it was reported that Chinese customs authorities notified the Japanese side of a suspension of import procedures for Japanese seafood (although Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently clarified that no formal diplomatic notification had been received). The measure reportedly applied to all items for which imports had previously been reopened and was implemented immediately by the customs authorities.
Moreover, China’s Ministry of Education issued risk warnings to prospective students considering study in Japan; the National Film Administration (under the broadcasting regulator) effectively froze the screening and import review of Japanese films; and local culture and tourism bureaus (including in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) reportedly revoked permits for more than twenty performances by Japanese artists without prior notice. These measures exemplify China’s typical pattern of “selective retaliation” across three channels—people-to-people exchange, culture, and the economy. During the same period, it was reported that Japanese singer Ayumi Hamasaki completed a performance without an audience after receiving an order from the Chinese side to cancel her concert, while Chinese artists continued to participate freely in concerts and performances within Japan without restrictions.
(3) Legal Warfare
International law and domestic law are employed as instruments for attacking, counterattacking, deterring, coercing, and even punishing adversaries. This approach involves interpreting provisions and definitions within international law in ways favorable to one’s own interests and, under the banner of “international law,” securing the legitimacy of one’s own actions while portraying the opponent as acting illegally, thereby weakening the adversary’s claims and positions.
In UN-related correspondence from 21 November onward, China repeatedly invoked the “enemy state clauses” of the UN Charter (Article 53, paragraph 1, and Article 107), portraying Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks as an “open challenge” to China’s “core interests” (the Taiwan issue) and asserting that Japan was returning to its wartime “aggressive” policies. The “enemy state clauses” were provisions included at the time of the UN Charter’s adoption in 1945, directed at the Axis powers of World War II (including Japan, Germany, and Italy), allowing the Allied powers (including China) to take “enforcement action” (including military measures) without Security Council authorization.
In other words, China has interpreted these clauses to mean that if “fascist/militarist states” such as Germany, Italy, or Japan were to take any actions toward renewed aggression, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union could act without Security Council authorization—and, more specifically, that if Japan were to take steps toward militarism and an aggressive policy, China would have the right to take direct military action without Security Council permission. China’s UN Ambassador Fu Cong reportedly reiterated in a letter to Secretary-General António Guterres that if Japan were to intervene militarily in the Taiwan issue, China would exercise the right of self-defense, invoking indications of the enemy state clauses as part of a warning message to the international community.
Japan promptly rebutted these claims. On 24 November, the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations posted a letter to the Secretary-General that the enemy state clauses had been deemed “obsolete and inoperative” in a 1995 UN General Assembly resolution (50/52), which China had supported, and that claims treating the clauses as valid were incompatible with the UN’s judgment and explaining Japan’s position. Japanese MOFA further argued that the 2005 World Summit Outcome document had adopted by consensus a decision to delete the enemy state clauses, that they have no practical effect, and that the prohibition on the threat or use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) prevails. China, however, has continued to insist on the clauses’ validity on the grounds that the text remains in the Charter.
China’s implementation of the SCO in this episode reveals both the effectiveness and the structural limitations of its Three Warfares–centered approach, particularly cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare presupposes the existence of target audiences whose perceptions can be shaped under conditions of strict information control; accordingly, within China’s tightly managed domestic discourse space, narratives aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) historical worldview—such as “history warfare,” assertions emphasizing Japan’s “militarization,” and claims questioning Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa (assertions made in Chinese media concerning sovereignty over Okinawa appear to be weakly substantiated on multiple grounds; for a detailed discussion, see the article) —function effectively to arouse patriotism, consolidate support for the Xi Jinping administration, and reinforce the CCP’s political legitimacy.
In the international arena, however, these narratives rapidly lose impact and sustainability. Unlike China’s domestic environment, the international discourse space is characterized by heightened awareness of authoritarian disinformation, widespread access to open-source information, and active fact-checking by governments, experts, and individuals alike. As a result, narratives that closely adhere to the CCP’s historical framework but lack support from fact-based empirical research (more troublingly, these academic researches present themselves as empirical studies despite being driven by predetermined conclusions from the outset) are increasingly subjected to scrutiny and rebuttal, exposing their weak theoretical and evidentiary foundations. Rather than shaping favorable perceptions for PRC abroad, such efforts often underscore the growing gap between China’s historically anchored self-perception and the way contemporary Japan is understood by the broader international community, thereby highlighting a fundamental limitation of China’s cognitive warfare.
Moreover, social media posts rooted in “great-power China” nationalism, which emphasize military superiority—including nuclear capabilities—have also provided the international community with an opportunity to discern which actor is, in practice, exhibiting militaristic tendencies.
4. Prospects for Future Sino–Japanese Relations and the Role of European Countries
It is unlikely that the current confrontation between an authoritarian/totalitarian bloc centered on China and Russia on the Eurasian continent and a democratic bloc concentrated along the Rimland will undergo a sudden reversal. Although the Trump administration’s “America First” orientation has introduced a degree of uncertainty among democratic states, it has not produced a change profound enough to fundamentally remake the overall international structure. Moreover, on both the Japanese and Chinese sides, the probability of abrupt shifts in domestic political variables that shape each government’s policy choices remains limited at present. Consequently, the external and internal conditions that propel Japan and China toward rivalry are likely to persist over the medium term.
Within the democratic camp, practical and multilateral security-cooperation frameworks are being steadily strengthened in order to minimize the impact of President Trump’s personal preferences. This trend is evolving into networked security cooperation that remains anchored in the Japan–U.S. alliance while expanding linkages to European partners, Australia, the Philippines, and others. From Beijing’s perspective, this amounts to an increasingly unfavorable international environment. In this episode, China was unable—apart from Russia—to mobilize permanent members of the UN Security Council, nor could it secure comprehensive support from EU or ASEAN states in a manner that would isolate Japan. As a result, China is likely to intensify its posture of delegitimizing the existing international order as “unfair” and to strengthen its ambition to construct a new order more advantageous to itself.
Under these international conditions, China’s domestic political dynamics have further reinforced a structure in which party, state organizations, military, and even individuals (such as ziganwu, patriotic SNS influencers) compete to demonstrate loyalty to President Xi Jinping. In this process, China has remained unable to break free from a “CCP historical narrative” that treats resistance to Japan as a central source of political legitimacy. It has increasingly privileged discourse grounded in “their truth” over empirically verifiable facts or scientific evidence. At the foundation of Beijing’s perception of Japan lies a sense of superiority rooted in hard power (military and economic strength), a great-power mentality encapsulated in the notion that “small states should obey great powers,” and an “impunity-through-patriotism” mindset implying that anything is permissible against Japan because Japan once inflicted harm on Chinese people. This cognitive structure is also a product of the Han-centric nationalist education promoted under Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”
Nevertheless, in the economic sphere, the two countries remain deeply interconnected, and a simplistic equation of political tension with economic decoupling does not accurately reflect reality.
According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance trade statistics for the first half of 2025 (January–June), Japan’s exports to China amounted to approximately ¥9.0 trillion ($60 billion), while imports from China reached roughly ¥12.9 trillion ($86 billion). China accounted for about 16.9 percent of Japan’s total exports; when Hong Kong is included, this figure exceeds 18 percent. On the import side, China represented approximately 23 percent of Japan’s total imports, making it Japan’s single largest supplier. These figures clearly indicate that China remains an indispensable trading partner for Japan, particularly with respect to imports.
From a quantitative perspective, therefore, the proposition that Japan maintains a high degree of economic dependence on China is correct. However, economic dependence cannot be assessed solely on the basis of aggregate trade volumes. The critical issue is the degree of substitutability associated with specific products and production stages. An examination of Japan’s exports to China reveals a concentration in intermediate goods and capital goods, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electronic components, and chemical materials.
According to the Country Commercial Guide published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Japanese companies account for approximately 90 percent of the global silicon wafer market, led by Shin-Etsu and SUMCO. A similarly high concentration is observed in the photoresist market, where Japanese firms such as JSR and Tokyo Ohka Kogyo together command roughly 90 percent of global market share. The implication of this structure is that, even if China advances its efforts toward semiconductor indigenization, materials—particularly high-purity and high-performance photoresists and silicon wafers—remain difficult to substitute in the short term. This is due to the stringent requirements of process compatibility, quality assurance, and yield stability inherent in advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Consequently, even when the absolute value of Japan’s exports to China does not rank at the top of overall bilateral trade, these materials exert a disproportionately large marginal impact on specific Chinese industries, making them especially suitable as sources of economic leverage.
A similar logic applies to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, particularly process-critical tools such as coating and developing systems. JETRO has explicitly noted that Tokyo Electron holds approximately 90 percent of the global market share in photoresist coating equipment. Furthermore, Japanese trade statistics indicate that semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items account for approximately 10.3 percent of Japan’s exports to China, underscoring their significance within bilateral trade. Due to stringent requirements for process compatibility, quality certification, and yield optimization, China faces significant obstacles in replacing these inputs with alternative suppliers in the short term. Consequently, Japan’s exports to China are not merely tradable commodities but constitute critical choke points in China’s industrial ecosystem.
China also possesses economic leverage vis-à-vis Japan. Japan’s imports from China are heavily concentrated in electrical machinery, mechanical equipment, and information and communications technology products, all of which are deeply embedded in Japanese industrial and consumer supply chains. While substitution may be feasible over the medium term, abrupt disruptions would likely generate price increases, delivery delays, and broader supply-chain instability. More structurally significant is China’s dominant position in the processing and refining of critical minerals. Rare earth elements, graphite, and related materials are essential inputs for advanced manufacturing and energy transition technologies, and many countries—including Japan—remain reliant on China’s refining and processing capacity.
Therefore, the Sino–Japanese economic relations should not be understood as a one-sided dependency, but rather as an asymmetric form of mutual interdependence differentiated by sector. The policy-relevant question is not which country is “more dependent,” but rather in which domains substitutability is limited and how such chokepoints shape strategic interaction under conditions of political tension. Indeed, even after roughly a month and a half of elevated tensions, China has not—beyond travel restrictions—implemented particularly powerful sanctions such as export controls on rare metals to Japan, and has largely confined itself to “diplomatic warfare” and the Three Warfares–style repertoire.
This has encouraged the growing view that “there is no need to fear China” in Japan. It would be extremely dangerous to assume that China will not escalate beyond its current level simply because it wishes to avoid economic losses, or to underestimate the risk of accidental armed confrontation. The strategic intent behind the Xi administration’s invocation of the “enemy state clauses” and its claims about the “illegal and invalidity of the San Francisco Peace Treaty,” alongside narratives of Japan’s “revival of militarism,” is to justify punitive action against Japan. Beijing clearly recognizes the role Japan would play in a Taiwan contingency scenario, particularly the strategic importance of military bases/facilities and logistics hubs in Japan including Okinawa. By constructing a narrative in which China must “protect Taiwanese compatriots” from “fascist Japan,” Beijing seeks to bolster the legitimacy of its potential military action. This rhetoric is structurally analogous to Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland and Russia’s “de-Nazification” narrative during its invasion of Ukraine. In that context, it cannot be ruled out that China may increase dangerous military provocations—such as fire-control radar illumination—while staging escalation as an “accidental” clash.
In light of the above, what the international community requires is an accurate grasp of China’s strategic intentions and behavioral patterns, and the proactive sharing of anticipated trajectories. At the same time, through multifaceted support for Taiwan, it is necessary to frustrate attempts to “break the will to fight” and to ensure that Beijing fully recognizes the enormous destruction costs and reputational costs that any “change of the status quo by force” would entail. Japan, for its part, must maintain calm responses grounded in facts and scientific evidence while strengthening a deterrent strategy of cost imposition. At the same time, it is essential to confront the reality that China is escalating the situation through narratives not grounded in fact, making academic or rational bargaining difficult to sustain.
For these reasons, alongside strengthening defense capabilities, Japan should reappraise the value of the intangible asset of trust that its postwar pacifism has cultivated over decades. This trust cannot be substituted by military or economic power and cannot be purchased. Preserving it requires practicing a form of “realistic pacifism” that leaves unchanged the principles and practices that need not be altered, while steadily developing the defense means that are necessary. In addition, maintaining communication through dual political and economic channels, managing escalation, and preventing changes to the status quo by force before they occur constitute the most rational strategy available to Japan and the international community under the reality of a prolonged Japan–China confrontation.
Although Japan is a significant trading partner, it does not constitute China’s largest export or import market. As a result, Japan’s leverage derived from market size alone is limited, and China can, to some extent, reallocate trade toward alternative markets. China’s trade is diversified across major partners, including the European Union, ASEAN countries, and the United States. The European Union (EU) and individual European states occupy an important position in China’s global trade network, both as a large market for Chinese goods and as a significant source of imports. In 2024, the total value of China–EU bilateral trade in goods reached approximately €732 billion (about US $780 billion), making the EU one of China’s largest trading partners after the United States ($582 billion). Within this total, the EU exported roughly €213.3 billion worth of goods to China importing approximately €517.8 billion from China, resulting in a substantial trade deficit for the EU on the goods account. Research indicates that in 2024, the US and EU together accounted for approximately 61.3 % of China’s global trade surplus.
Accordingly, European countries need to prepare in advance for both the deterrence of a contingency involving Taiwan and for the manner in which they would respond should such a contingency unfortunately occur. Given the constraints imposed by Europe’s military strength and geographic distance, the core of these preparations is likely to consist of promoting cooperation of defense industries, developing response procedures centered on the United Nations, shaping international public opinion that rejects attempts to change the status quo by force, and preparing for the possible implementation of economic sanctions against China. It is also necessary to clearly communicate the significance and necessity of these measures to European citizens. In this context, it should be recognized that a complete shift from “values-based diplomacy” to “economic diplomacy” would amount to an abdication of the responsibilities borne by democratic states in the contemporary international community.