In January 2024, the Republic of China (Taiwan) elected Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as its next president, ushering in a historic third term in power for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Thanks to an effective collaborative approach across government and civil society, to a great extent Taiwan has managed to counter interference from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As Taiwan’s case shows, even the best-prepared societies face growing challenges from foreign interference and information manipulation. There is therefore an urgent need for democracies to learn from each other and coordinate efforts to withstand authoritarian threats.
The explosive rise of digital media and generative AI, declining trust in democratic institutions and disinformation-fuelled social polarisation are among the challenges. The European Union (EU) and its member states are not spared from these, presenting unconventional threats to national security, societal stability, and democracy. Challenges are interconnected: malign actors simultaneously deploy strategies and techniques related to influence and information operations across multiple domains and towards various target societies.
The EU and its member states have intensified institutional-level efforts to strengthen defenses against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). They have further stepped up efforts in light of the growing China-Russia strategic alignment. Progress in the EU’s response since the 2019 European Parliament elections includes new tools for platform regulation, the active engagement of different actors in society and dedicated legislation. However, the recent emphasis on FIMI may at points appear somewhat selective, focusing primarily on disinformation and information manipulation, while China historically relies more on propaganda, primarily promoting positive messages rather than spreading outright falsehoods. The Russian-style disinformation is a relatively new weapon in the CCP arsenal, although one that has been growing in importance since at least the 2020 Taiwan Presidential elections and the subsequent pandemic.
Within the cooperation framework the EU has already established with Taiwan, the bloc can learn from its social resilience consolidated throughout decades of exposure to foreign interference attempts. Taiwan is often cited as ‘patient zero’ of PRC information operations and provides valuable insight for Europe in improving its own, whole-of-society strategy. Learning from Taiwan’s experience can provide the knowledge and skillset to boost Europe’s resilience and defend democratic principles.
This brief provides the following key recommendations to the EU institutions:
- Raise awareness of Taiwan’s experience with disinformation
- Strengthen the EU’s counter-disinformation capacity with Taiwan as inspiration
- Seek EU-Taiwan cooperation for local solutions
Full text in PDF.