Key Findings:
◉ The LDP, led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, secured 316 seats and, with JIP, achieved a dominant majority in the House of Representatives (the lower house). The outcome reflected not only reactions to China but also Takaichi’s diplomatic visibility, economic expectations, opposition disorganization, labor realignment, and shifting youth security perceptions. Structural domestic change proved more decisive than external factors.
◉ The LDP’s two-thirds majority in the lower house enables it to override the House of Councilors (the upper house) rejections and control key decisions on budgets and treaties. However, constitutional amendment still requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers and a national referendum, LDP’s lack of majority in the upper house makes Komeito’s stance decisive amid persistent inter-party divisions over Article 9.
◉ With a stable lower house majority, the Takaichi administration is positioned to accelerate defense capability improving. Planned revisions to the three National Security related documents will strengthen security cooperation among alliance and like-minded partners, preparing Pacific theater defense, expanding stand-off and missile defense capabilities, enhancing operational sustainability, and supporting defense industry. The buildup emphasizes asymmetric deterrence rather than expansionist power projection.
◉ Arguments that Japanese pacifism has become hollow conflate normative principles with policy practice. Japan continues to renounce aggressive war and limit force to self-defense within its alliance framework. What has evolved are practical constraints shaped during the Cold War, not the underlying constitutional commitment to defensive security and deterrence.
◉ Although politically stable in the lower house, the administration faces constraints in the upper house and three strategic challenges: reinforcing alliance credibility with the United States through economic-security contributions, balancing deterrence and dialogue with China, and addressing demographic and economic decline to sustain national power and long-term security capacity.
1. The Victory of Takaichi and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
In the 51st general election for the House of Representatives held on February 8, 2026, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP; Jiyū Minshutō) secured 316 out of 465 seats, achieving a historic victory by surpassing, on its own, the two-thirds threshold (310 seats). Its coalition partner, Japan Innovation Party (JIP; Nippon Ishin no Kai), won 36 seats, bringing the combined total to 352. In contrast, the “Centrist Reform Alliance,” formed through electoral cooperation between the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP; Rikken Minshutō) and Komeito (Kōmeitō), obtained only 49 seats, representing a significant decline from its pre-election strength. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP; Nihon Kyōsantō) was reduced to four seats, Reiwa (Reiwa Shinsengumi) to one, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP; Shakai Minshutō) also struggled to retain representation. The fragmentation and retreat of the opposition accelerated the concentration of seats in the hands of the ruling bloc.
What accounts for the victory of the LDP under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi? Some observers abroad attribute the outcome to public backlash against China’s pressure on Japan. However, such an explanation based solely on external pressure is insufficient. Since assuming office, Prime Minister Takaichi has demonstrated diplomatic visibility. She emphasized continuity with the strategic line established by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, engaging in security consultations with U.S. President Donald Trump under the slogan “Japan is Back,” holding friendly talks with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung symbolized by a joint drum performance and including dialogue on historical issues such as the 1942 Chosei coal mine tragedy, and cultivating personal trust with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—highlighted by birthday greetings and the symbolic “Can always count on me” remark upon departure. Her efforts to strengthen ties with leaders sharing conservative values were positively received domestically. Importantly, her popularity derives less from an “Iron Lady” image than from public expectations for domestic economic revitalization and a preference among voters for political leaders who demonstrate attentiveness and relatable conduct rather than confrontational rhetoric.
More decisive, however, were strategic missteps by the opposition. The Centrist Reform Alliance, established on January 16 by members of the CDP and Komeito, focused more on criticizing the LDP and Prime Minister Takaichi personally than on presenting policy alternatives, failing to expand voter sympathy. In 42 of the 289 single-member districts, opposition candidates were not unified, leading to vote fragmentation. Moreover, the Alliance used a voter’s hashtag—“Mom will stop the war!”—to suggest that the Takaichi administration might introduce conscription and initiate war. Such messaging resonated little with younger voters who perceive the reality of military invasion through Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the risk of a Taiwan contingency as real security threats. A perceptual gap thus emerged between the traditional Japanese political left’s image of “peace” modeled on “wars initiated by Japan” in World War II and a contemporary conception of peace maintained through strengthened deterrence against potential external aggression. Survey data indicating that 30 percent of self-identified liberals aged 10–30 voted for the LDP reflects this shift.
Labor movement dynamics were also indicative. In September 2021, the Toyota labor union expressed support for the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) in reaction to the CDP’s cooperation with the Communist Party. This move signaled worker distrust toward traditional liberal parties perceived as prioritizing partisan interests. In the present election, similar strategic miscalculations were repeated by the CDP–Komeito alliance (which remains separate in the House of Councillors) to establish the Centrist Reform Alliance. Additionally, some Japanese leading feminists’ reluctance to endorse the first female prime minister prompted voter questions regarding the purpose of gender equality advocacy.
China’s increasingly assertive posture toward Japan also played a role. Following Prime Minister Takaichi’s November explanation of a “survival-threatening situation” in her explanation about possible scenarios of a Taiwan contingency, reports emerged of customs delays on certain rare metals and restrictions on Japanese seafood imports by China. Public concern in Japan regarding economic security and national defense subsequently intensified. Furthermore, when the Chinese government officially questioned Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa—referring to it as “Ryukyu”—LDP candidates won all four Okinawa districts, opposition dominated all four districts in 2014 election, reflecting heightened local threat perception, although opposition fragmentation also contributed to this outcome.
China’s restriction on group tours to Japan further attracted attention. According to Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) statistics, 330,000 Chinese visitors arrived in December 2025, approximately half the 600,000 recorded in December 2024. Yet total foreign visitors increased from 3.49 million to 3.62 million during the same period, with growth from Taiwan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America offsetting the decline. Public debate intensified over incidents involving traffic accidents by Chinese visitors who obtained driver’s licenses through simplified procedures and provocative remarks circulated on social media. Nonetheless, significant numbers of independent travelers from China and Hong Kong continued to visit, underscoring the importance of distinguishing between the Chinese Communist Party and ordinary Chinese citizens. Comprehensive decoupling from China remains impracticable.
In sum, the LDP’s victory cannot be attributed solely to Takaichi’s popularity or to backlash against Chinese pressure. Opposition disorganization, labor realignment, changing security perceptions, and social tensions over China all interacted cumulatively. While traces of influence operations on social media platforms like X, believed to originate from China, have also been pointed out, they did not significantly impact the election results beyond distorting the perception of support and influence within Japan’s left-wing camp. Structural changes in domestic politics were the principal drivers of the 316-seat outcome.
2. What the House of Representatives Election Results Enable—and Do Not Enable
In the House of Representatives, the LDP’s substantial seat gains have significantly expanded what it can do institutionally. Constitutional amendment, however, faces a dual hurdle: securing a two-thirds majority in the House of Councillors (Article 96 of the Constitution) and then obtaining majority approval in a subsequent national referendum. Given Komeito’s stance—Komeito effectively holds the key to the numbers in the House of Councillors—and given inter-party divergences over the substance of proposed amendments, constitutional revision is not a straightforward path.
In this House of Representatives election, the LDP won 316 seats, exceeding on its own two-thirds of the chamber’s statutory membership of 465 (i.e., 310 seats). As a result, the institutional capacity envisioned in Article 59(2) of the Constitution is in place: even if a bill is rejected by the House of Councillors, it can be re-passed in the House of Representatives if two-thirds or more of members present vote in favor. Article 96(1) requires “two-thirds or more of all the members of each House” to initiate a constitutional amendment, and in the House of Representatives the LDP alone can satisfy that requirement. If Nippon Ishin no Kai/JIP (36 seats) is added, the total becomes 352 seats, rendering the lower house advantage decisive. Under the constitutional design, the House of Representatives ultimately prevails on the budget (Article 60); treaty approval is treated in the same manner (Article 61); and the designation of the prime minister is also decided finally by the House of Representatives (Article 67). Institutionally, therefore, a ruling-bloc-led legislative environment has been consolidated in the lower house.
In the House of Councillors (statutory membership: 248), by contrast, the LDP (including the “Independent Caucus”) holds 101 seats and JIP holds 19, for a combined total of 120—short of a majority (124). For the passage of ordinary legislation, a majority of members present is required (Article 56(2) of the Constitution), and thus the ruling side cannot control the upper house on its own. That said, even where a bill is rejected by the House of Councillors, the House of Representatives can re-pass it by a two-thirds vote (as noted above under Article 59(2) of the Constitution).
With respect to constitutional amendment, the requirements are even more stringent. Initiation requires a two-thirds majority of all members in each of the two Houses (Article 96(1) of the Constitution). In the House of Councillors, this translates into 166 seats (or 165 in the event of a vacancy). The total of the LDP’s 101 seats plus Nippon Ishin no Kai (JIP)’s 19 plus the Democratic Party for the People (DPP)’s 25 reaches only 145, leaving a shortfall of more than 20 seats. This is where Komeito’s presence (21 seats) becomes decisive. If Komeito were to join, the total would reach 166, and—at least numerically—the initiation requirement would be met in the upper house as well. In other words, Komeito effectively holds the key to constitutional revision in the House of Councillors.
However, Komeito has historically adopted a cautious stance toward constitutional revision. While it has shown some openness to debate on issues such as an emergency clause, it is particularly cautious regarding revision of Article 9—especially questions surrounding Article 9(2) (the clause on the non-possession of “military strength”), including proposals to explicitly mention the Self-Defense Forces in relation to Article 9(2) or to delete Article 9(2) itself. The LDP advocates explicitly specifying the Self-Defense Forces in relation to Article 9(2) and creating an emergency clause, whereas JIP calls for a fundamental revision that includes deleting Article 9(2). DPP is also broadly positive toward textual codification, but the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) remains cautious about revising Article 9, and the Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi are explicitly opposed. The Party of Do It Yourself (Sanseitō) likewise has its own constitutional-making concept, and it cannot be assumed that it would endorse the LDP’s proposal as-is.
According to a recent public opinion survey, a nationwide poll found that approximately 67 percent “support proceeding with preparations toward constitutional revision,” while about 25 percent “oppose” doing so. However, the same survey indicates that the policies the public most wants the Takaichi administration to address include countermeasures against rising prices and a consumption tax cut (40.7 percent), pensions and healthcare (22.6 percent), and diplomacy and security (10.8 percent), whereas only 3.3 percent regard constitutional revision as the top priority. Constitutional revision, therefore, is not necessarily perceived as an immediate priority. Furthermore, support for constitutional revision derives from the perception that the Constitution, having remained unamended since its promulgation in 1947, requires updating in various respects; it does not necessarily imply that all supporters favor revision of Article 9.
3. Changes in Japan’s Security Posture
The Takaichi administration has secured stable majorities in the House of Representatives, thereby establishing a firm political foundation for policy implementation except constitutional amendment. In this respect, the political conditions resemble those of the second Abe administration, during which sustained improvements in defense policy became possible. In particular, over the next four years, there is a high likelihood that both the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of Japan’s defense capabilities will proceed steadily.
First, the Takaichi administration plans to revise the so-called “Three Strategic Documents” by the summer of 2026 — the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) — which were revised under the Kishida administration in December 2022. The 2022 revision explicitly provided for strengthening the Japan–U.S. alliance; increasing defense expenditures to a level equivalent to 2 percent of GDP; acquiring stand-off (long-range counterstrike) capabilities; expanding cooperation with like-minded partners; and reinforcing the defense industrial and infrastructural base. The 2026 revision is expected not only to accelerate the operationalization and practical implementation of these measures but also to consider the large-scale operationalization of unmanned systems, the strengthening of sustainability (i.e., war-fighting endurance), the reinforcement of defense posture along the “Pacific theater,” and the positioning of the defense industry as a pillar of Japan’s growth strategy.
The background to these developments lies in the reality that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has advanced beyond the First Island Chain and has reached the stage of conducting simultaneous deployments and exercises in the Western Pacific involving the aircraft carrier strike groups of the Liaoning and the Shandong. In recent two decades, Japan’s defense concept emphasized the East China Sea and the Nansei Islands. Going forward, however, it will be indispensable to ensure sea-lane protection and safeguard Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Pacific, and undertake broad-area responses that include integrated operations with U.S. forces. In other words, the defense of U.S. force projection and logistics routes from the U.S. mainland through Hawaii and Guam to Japan is essential for maintaining a broader regional defense posture extending toward Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In this context, the possible introduction of nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of sustained, high-speed, long-range deployment has emerged as a subject of policy debate. Nevertheless, due to domestic legal constraints, and technical and fiscal challenges, such an option would not be realized immediately and requires careful examination. In addition, reflecting lessons from Ukraine, the development of operational structures for unmanned systems (UAVs, USVs, UUVs, etc.) is likely to be incorporated.
Particularly noteworthy is the enhancement of various stand-off (long-range missile) capabilities for island defense and potential counterstrike missions. Japan’s development of stand-off defense capabilities began in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019, through the import of the Norwegian Kongsberg-produced Joint Strike Missile (JSM) (range exceeding 550 km, deployable from the F-35) and the U.S.-manufactured Lockheed Martin JASSM-ER (range exceeding 926 km, deployable from the F-15), as well as the development of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Block 1 (range exceeding 500 km, it will be deployed in Shizuoka by the end of March this year). Subsequently, following a Cabinet decision in December 2020, development commenced on an upgraded version of Mitsubishi’s Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missile (range exceeding 1,000 km, the first launcher units were deployed in Kumamoto on March 8, 2026). Furthermore, the “2022 National Security Strategy” decided to strengthen stand-off capabilities more broadly, initiating development by Kawasaki Heavy Industries of an Island-defense missile (range approximately 2,500 km). As a gap-filler pending completion of that development, Japan has also moved forward with the introduction of the U.S.-manufactured Raytheon RGM-109E/UGM-109E Block IV/V Tomahawk (range exceeding 1,600 km).
This approach closely resembles the strategy previously adopted by China when it recognized its relative inferiority in naval and air capabilities: namely, the construction of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) layered system combining various ballistic and cruise missiles as part of an asymmetric capability-building effort. In this sense, Japan’s current defense buildup should not be interpreted as expansionist. Rather, it reflects an asymmetric warfare approach premised upon recognition of relative disadvantages in certain capability domains.
In addition, the strengthening of new missile defense capabilities is proceeding at an accelerated pace. The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) development program, which Northrop Grumman had been advancing since 2021, was formalized as a Japan–U.S. joint development project through an agreement concluded in May 2024, under which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries joined the program and is developing key components. The objective is to establish countermeasures against hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which China, Russia, and North Korea have tested in recent years in order to evade existing missile defense networks. It is important to note that Japan’s recent defense capability development is not primarily aimed at enhancing power projection capabilities.
At the same time, revisions to operational guidelines of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology are advancing. Currently, transfers are limited to equipment directly used for five categories: rescue, transport, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping. Relaxation or removal of this framework is under consideration. However, transfers would remain limited to countries that have concluded Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreements with Japan (currently 17 countries). Japan is also moving toward concluding such an agreement with Ukraine.
Support for Ukraine is being strengthened within institutional constraints. Japan has provided financial contributions to the Partnership for Ukraine’s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) and supplied non-lethal equipment. It has also expressed willingness to join NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) framework. On the other hand, constitutional and statutory constraints continue to render Japan cautious with respect to the direct provision of lethal weaponry. Furthermore, plans are being prepared to strengthen the functions of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) and upgrade to “National Intelligence Agency (NIA)” in order to enhance information collection and analysis capabilities, and promote cooperation with foreign counterparts. NIA will be granted authority to issue directives to ministries and agencies to strengthen intelligence activities led by the Prime Minister’s Office. Prime minister Takaichi has long advocated for strengthening intelligence capabilities and pledged to establish the agency as part of her campaign platform during the leadership election.
These developments understandably give rise in some quarters to concerns that Japan may be “remilitarizing.” Indeed, certain foreign media outlets have characterized Prime Minister Takaichi as “far-right.” However, Japan’s security policy remains anchored in the Japan–U.S. alliance, keeps order-based international order, denies changing the status quo by force, and seeks to maintain and reinforce the existing international order through cooperation with the G7 and other like-minded countries. It differs qualitatively from prewar strategies that sought unilateral alteration of the status quo through military force.
In reflection upon its external wars since 1894 and its defeat in 1945, post-war Japan has maintained the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy (senshu bōei). However, in addition to the policy of exercising the right of self-defense only against attacks on Japan (“armed attack situation”), the Abe administration changed the interpretation of the Constitution in July 2014. This change allows for the limited exercise of the right of self-defense to support an ally when an attack occurs against that ally and it seriously affects Japan’s existence (“survival-threatening situation”). While paving the way for the limited exercise of the right to collective self-defense, it has refrained from possessing overtly offensive weapons systems such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, or long-range carrier strike groups, and even its transport aircraft and vessels are not designed with large-scale long-distance force projection in mind. Moreover, Japan’s war-sustaining capacity—particularly stockpiles of ammunition, missiles, and spare parts—remains limited. Institutional arrangements for national and private stockpiling of critical minerals, energy resources, and essential foodstuffs such as rice, wheat, and salt have not been designed primarily with wartime contingencies in mind.
Furthermore, Japan’s economic structure is heavily dependent on manufacturing and trade, relying on overseas supply for much of its resources, energy, and food. Damage to international reputation or economic isolation would directly undermine national interests. Structurally and strategically, therefore, the potential gains from attempting to revise the status quo through force would not outweigh the associated costs. Japan lacks both the incentive and the structural conditions conducive to proactive revisionism.
Accordingly, recent claims by the Chinese government regarding a revival of Japanese “militarism” disregard the reality that Japan, as a member of a community of states sharing certain values, is seeking to build effective defense capabilities and deterrence within the framework of alliances and partnerships, and to contribute to maintaining balance and stability in the Western Pacific. In other words, from China’s perspective, the most undesirable outcome would be Japan’s successful establishment of realistic and effective defense capabilities combined with strengthened cooperative frameworks among like-minded states. This constitutes the core of China’s current cognitive warfare to the international society and its economic coercion to Japan.
4. Is Japanese “Pacifism” Hollow?
In recent years, it has been argued that Japan’s postwar pacifism has become “hollow.” However, debates over pacifism frequently conflate normative principles with policy practice. These two dimensions should be clearly distinguished analytically.
The normative core principles consist of the renunciation of aggressive war and the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy embodied in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan; the acceptance of the use of force strictly within the scope of the right of self-defense as recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; and the existence of the Japan–U.S. alliance, which is structurally intertwined with these principles. By contrast, practice refers to the political and normative frameworks adopted in domestic politics to operationalize those principles—namely, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; the Three Principles on Arms Exports (and their successor, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology); and the informal “one percent of GDP” guideline for defense expenditures.
Many of these practical constraints were formed during the Cold War under conditions of intense ideological confrontation between East and West. For example, in 1967 the Sato administration clarified the Three Principles on Arms Exports—prohibiting exports to (i) communist-bloc countries, (ii) countries subject to arms embargoes under United Nations resolutions, and (iii) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976, the Miki Cabinet further tightened the arms export principles and established the practice of effectively restraining defense expenditures within approximately one percent of GDP. These measures were products of compromise amid strong domestic anti-militarist public opinion and parliamentary confrontation between ruling and opposition parties. Likewise, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles—“not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons”—proposed by the Sato administration in 1967, became entrenched as a domestic political consensus, even though they inherently contained tensions with reliance on nuclear deterrence under the Japan–U.S. alliance.
Accordingly, these practices were not immutable doctrines but policy instruments subject to adjustment in response to changes in the international security environment and in Japan’s role within the alliance. Indeed, defense expenditures exceeded the one-percent ceiling under the Nakasone administration; the 2014 shift from the Three Principles on Arms Exports to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology marked a significant institutional revision; and the post-2022 framework raising defense expenditures toward 2 percent of GDP can be situated along this trajectory of adaptation.
Similar policy transformations have occurred in Europe in response to rapid changes in the security environment. Finland and Sweden revised their long-standing military non-alignment policies and joined NATO in response to heightened perceptions of the Russian threat. From March 2025 onward, the Baltic states and Poland withdrew from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and several European countries have undertaken defense policy restructuring that includes reconsideration or reintroduction of conscription. These developments do not signify the disappearance of underlying normative commitments; rather, they demonstrate adjustments in security practice.
However, the core normative principles of Japan’s pacifism—limiting the exercise of the right to self-defense strictly to cases of self-defense or attacks against important allies that threaten Japan’s existence, and rejecting wars of aggression—remain intact. Policies that seek proactive overseas military operations beyond this framework would be extremely difficult to justify politically or legally. Although the Takaichi administration is strengthening defense capabilities, it has not indicated any intention to alter these foundational principles. Moreover, given the structural nature of the Japan–U.S. alliance, substantial deviation from Japan’s constitutional order is not a realistic prospect.
In addition, Japan lacks the economic and demographic capacity to engage in a quantitative arms race with China. Even a simple comparison of defense budgets and force structures makes clear that pursuing parity with China would be strategically unrealistic. Therefore, Japan’s defense policy remains limited to enhancing the credibility of deterrence through cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners, and to a “cost-imposing” approach toward China—making Beijing recognize that the costs of altering the status quo would outweigh the benefits and are enduring—rather than achieving symmetric expansion.
In sum, Japanese pacifism persists at the level of normative principle. What has changed is the method of its practical implementation in response to evolving external conditions. Arguments that fail to distinguish between principle and practice and that hastily conclude that Japan is “remilitarizing” do not sufficiently account for the institutional constraints of the postwar constitutional order or for the alliance structure within which Japan operates.
5. Future Challenges
Although the Takaichi administration has secured an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives and thereby established a stable governing foundation for the next four years through February 2030, it will not command a majority in the House of Councillors at least until July 2028. (Members of the House of Councillors serve six-year terms, with half of the seats contested every three years; there is no provision for dissolution.) The administration must therefore address three interrelated challenges: managing relations with the United States; navigating relations with China; and confronting Japan’s declining national power and structural domestic problems.
Relations with the United States
Amid an increasingly unstable security environment, one of Japan’s highest priorities is to ensure confidence that it will not be “abandoned” by its ally, the United States. The Takaichi administration appears, at least for the moment, to have achieved a degree of success in this regard. However, it has been suggested that the Trump administration could become a “lame duck,” depending on domestic policy missteps or the outcome of the U.S. midterm elections.
Under such circumstances, mere alignment with U.S. positions would be insufficient. In parallel with strengthening Japan’s own national capabilities, it is necessary to demonstrate concretely that Japan is indispensable to U.S. strategy. In this context, Japan’s investment and loans of approximately ¥80 trillion ($550 billion USD) to the United States should be understood not merely as economic activity but as strategic capital.
Accordingly, Japan has sought to play substantive roles in core U.S. policy priorities such as Indo-Pacific strategy, supply-chain restructuring, and advanced technology development. If Japan makes tangible contributions in areas including semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, sea-lane protection, and the modernization of thermal power plants within the United States, the Japan–U.S. alliance will evolve beyond a purely military alliance into a deeper economic security alliance. Participation in economic security frameworks—such as “Pax Silica” (launched in December 2025 under the Trump administration to enhance semiconductor supply-chain resilience) and “FORGE” (launched in February 2026 to stabilize critical mineral supply chains)—is symbolically significant, irrespective of their precise policy effectiveness.
At the same time, Japan intends to adopt a strategy of articulating its views to the United States from the position of a “key ally.” Rather than merely expressing support, Japan seeks to present proactive proposals regarding what is optimal for Indo-Pacific stability and to engage substantively in policy formation, thereby enhancing the symmetry of the alliance. This approach may also offer advantages to European countries facing similar dilemmas vis-à-vis U.S.–China strategic competition.
In addition, in light of the significant changes in Japan’s surrounding security environment and the increasing frequency of Chinese economic coercion, the Takaichi administration plans to revise the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” vision. The revised vision is expected to incorporate strengthening the economic foundation through diversification of critical mineral supply chains; promoting economic growth through problem-solving and support for free trade; and reinforcing cooperation with ASEAN countries—centered on the Japan–U.S. alliance—through the provision of defense equipment and related capacity-building assistance.
Relations with China
If the Takaichi administration continues in office over the next four years, an important question is whether China will accept this situation as a new “normal” and seek stabilization of relations, or whether it will persist in applying pressure and mounting challenges. Among some scholars of international politics, there is a view that China’s external behavior may become somewhat restrained in light of economic slowdown and a deteriorating external environment.
On the other hand, structural problems within China such as a real estate downturn, rising youth unemployment, and successive dismissals of senior military officers have become increasingly visible developments that may affect the regime’s governing capacity and legitimacy. Under such conditions, the Xi Jinping leadership’s emphasis on “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” major-power consciousness, and narratives of superiority cannot be ignored as tools of domestic consolidation.
In the context of relations with Japan, there remains a risk that nationalism mobilized around historical issues could be reactivated. However, Chinese society is not monolithic; there are substantial constituencies that favor pragmatic and rational cooperation with Japan. The concern is that if hardline anti-Japan rhetoric expands socially, it may become increasingly difficult for dissenting voices to be expressed openly. Accordingly, Japan must maintain both deterrence and dialogue while continuing societal-level exchanges and trust-building efforts.
Declining National Power and Structural Challenges
Ultimately, the sustainability of security policy depends on national power. The Japanese economy faces long-term low growth, exchange-rate volatility, and stagnation of real wages. Moreover, demographic decline is accelerating, and the working-age population continues to shrink. As of June 2024, Japan’s total fertility rate (TFR) stood at 1.15, with further decline projected in 2026.
Sustaining increased defense expenditures and economic security policies requires a stable tax base and industrial competitiveness. In this sense, expanding the acceptance of foreign workers to secure labor supply, promoting productivity-enhancing reforms, and supporting technological innovation are domestic policy challenges directly linked to security sustainability. Furthermore, if political necessity were to arise to increase defense-related expenditures to levels comparable to the 2025 NATO Hague Summit commitment—5 percent (3.5 percent for equipment and 1.5 percent for military infrastructure and related areas)—the majority of such spending would flow abroad unless Japan strengthens its domestic defense industrial base. For this reason, integrating the defense industry into Japan’s growth strategy is regarded as indispensable.
In sum, under the Takaichi administration, Japan must simultaneously manage three overarching tasks: deepening the alliance with the United States; balancing deterrence and dialogue with China; and revitalizing the domestic economy and society in order to “make Japan strong and prosperous.” The diplomatic calendar underscores the intensity of the coming period: Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit to the United States is scheduled for early March; President Trump’s visit to China at the end of March or early April; the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 29–31; U.S. midterm elections on November 3; and the APEC Shenzhen Summit on November 18–19. Amid rising security tensions, the key to policy management will lie in maintaining continuity of core principles while responding realistically to evolving strategic conditions.