Once a model of political and economic stability in the Pacific, Sāmoa has in recent years swung from political turmoil to economic crisis. China is a significant factor in this churn. As the proverb says, E le falala fua le niu, ae falala ona o le matagi—the coconut tree does not sway on its own, it sways because of the wind. A decade of China-linked loans, opaque ventures, and elite cultivation have magnified factionalism and eroded guardrails. The economy, already heavily aid-reliant (13th globally by aid-to-GNI), carries massive Chinese debt from projects such as a costly, dual-use-adjacent airport and national broadband network. By 2024, repayments to China ranked among the world’s highest relative to GNI, tightening the fiscal vise and deepening dependency.1 Now years of cultivation appear to have posted a result, as Susuga Laʻaulialemalietoa Leuatea Polataivao Fosi Schmidt (Laʻaulialemalietoa), a controversial Sāmoan politician, has unexpectedly become prime minister. His electorate stands out as the only one to have received millions from companies connected to China’s united front.2 These connections include Chinese-backed tourism ventures and cryptocurrency projects tied to his family and political network, fuelling concerns about foreign interference shaping Sāmoa’s political landscape.
The relationship with China is fundamentally unequal. Sāmoa is a small, open democracy with fragile administrative capacity, while China is a centralized Leninist party-state able to mobilize and coordinate formidable diplomatic, commercial, security, propaganda, and financial tools. This asymmetry is reinforced by the CCP’s united front system, which channels and choreographs external contacts across government, business, and civil society through front organizations presented as independent counterparts.
China is interested in Sāmoa for several reasons, chief among them the island nation’s strategic position in the Third Island Chain bridging U.S. territories and allied partners across the Pacific. Influence in Apia offers access to air and maritime nodes, votes in regional and multilateral forums, and commercial footholds in EEZ fisheries and prospective seabed resources. Our research has found that China’s foreign interference activities in Sāmoa have had a corrosive effect on Sāmoan democracy, sovereignty, and custom. The situation will be of concern to many people in Sāmoa, as well as New Zealand, Australia and other neighbouring states. Proximity to American Sāmoa, a U.S. territory, raises the stakes for Washington: risks of illegal fishing and commercial surveillance, pressure on borders and governance, and a potential gateway for eroding U.S. presence and freedom of action in the wider Pacific region.
Drawing on Chinese and English-language sources, official statements, company filings, and local reporting, this paper maps the principal channels of leverage— elite capture, party-to-party ties, propaganda work, policing and security diplomacy, economic inducements and coercion, and links through the Chinese diaspora. It concludes with recommendations to build resilience and safeguard Sāmoa’s sovereignty.
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